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I. INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The National Forest Management Act1 (NFMA) is, both procedur-
ally and substantively, a remarkable statute. Passed in the wake of a
national controversy over the Forest Service's ability to manage the
national forests properly, NFMA signaled a profound change in Con-
gress's traditionally deferential attitude toward the agency. It has been
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988) (amending Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974).
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called "the most complete forestry legislation ever passed." 2
The NFMA has not resolved the problems associated with managing
the nation's public forest lands, however. In the ensuing two decades,
controversy over national forest management has intensified-socially,
economically, and politically. This controversy has found its way into the
courts as well.
Charles Wilkinson and Michael Anderson, in their seminal 1985
article on the National Forest Management Act,' observed that the
NFMA's first decade produced surprisingly little litigation, but they
predicted much greater judicial involvement thereafter.' The past decade
has indeed seen an abundance of litigation.'
Several factors suggest that judicial review of the NFMA, and the
increasingly active role of the courts in the management of the National
Forest System, will continue. The intense, conflicting demands upon the
various resources of the national forests will grow, as commodity produc-
tion collides with resource protection and recreational use.' At the same
time, the ever-expanding web of environmental laws and regulations
complicate management decisions and provide ample fodder for legal
challenges.
Organizations representing industry and environmental groups regu-
larly use the courts to further their overall objectives and to seek redress for
specific Forest Service management actions. The spotted owl controversy
in the Pacific Northwest rose to national prominence in April 1993, when
President Clinton convened a conference to solve the dilemma posed by
Judge William Dwyer's injunction banning the harvest of old growth
2. Arnold W. Bolle, The Bitterroot Revisited: A University Re-view of the Forest Service, 10
PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 15 (1989).
3. Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning In the National
Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1 (1985), reprinted as CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON.
LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1987). This article gives an in-depth
overview of the history of national forest planning and the legislative history of the N FMA. Like many
NFMA scholars, judges, lawyers, and Forest Service personnel, we are grateful for this outstanding,
authoritative work, and have drawn extensively from it in this article.
4. Id. at 8.
5. This article examines approximately 20 federal court decisions on the NFMA. all of which
have been decided since 1985.
6. Several statistics highlight these conflicts. The national forests contain approximately 50
percent of the nation's softwood timber. Waddell, Oswald, & Powell, Forest Statistics of the United
States, 1987, reprinted in COGGINS, WILKINSON & LESHY, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW 642 (3d ed. 1993). Substantial reserves of hard rock minerals and oil and gas are also found on the
national forests. Those same forests also provide recreational opportunities numbering 295.473.000
million visitor use days in 1993. FOREST SERVICE WASHINGTON OFFICE RIM REPORT, U.S. DEPT OF
AGRIC. (1993). The national forests contain 380 wilderness areas, comprising over 33 million acres,
one third of the total wilderness nation-wide. COGGINS ET AL, supra, at 1032. National forests provide
crucial habitat for much of the wildlife of the western U.S., from big game animals (e.g., elk, deer. big
horn sheep) to endangered species (e.g., grizzly bears, spotted owls, and chinook salmon).
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timber in spotted owl habitat on national forests.' This is but one example
of the battle over the national forests that is being played out in courtrooms
from Texas8 to Montana, 9 from Georgia'0 to California." Across the
nation, people are demanding more from their national forests; more
timber, more wilderness, more recreational opportunities. Yet the land
base of the National Forest System - currently 191 million acres - has
changed only minimally since 1921.12 As competing demands continue to
escalate on the National Forest System's limited land base, the laws that
guide the Forest Service will to continue to play a significant role in
resolving these conflicts. 13 It is important and timely to examine both the
promise and the limitations of those laws, principally the NFMA, which
serve as a paradigm for understanding the divergent social and political
forces competing for use of the resources on the national forests.
This article will address the entire body of published decisions under
the NFMA, and a number of unpublished opinions as well. Our intention is
to analyze how courts have treated the NFMA's substantive and proce-
dural provisions, to understand the NFMA in the context of other
environmental laws and to analyze how NFMA litigation fits into the
greater, more well-settled body of administrative law.
This Article is divided into four sections. Section One reviews the
legal/historical context in which Congress passed NFMA. Section Two
analyzes how courts have treated the substantive provisions of NFMA, and
provides an overview of forest-plan litigation. Section Three examines
procedural obstacles to judicial review under NFMA, such as standing,
exhaustion, and the scope and standard of review. Section Four will draw
some connecting threads and analyze future trends for NFMA litigation
and judicial oversight of forest management.
7. The injunction was granted in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D.
Wash. 1991). The "timber summit" was held in Portland, Oregon, on April 2, 1993. See generally
Timothy Egan, Thunder of Debate on Owls and Jobs Rings in Forests as Opponents Face Off, N.Y.
TEMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at A22; Timothy Egan, Clinton Under Crossfire at Logging Conference, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, § I at 6.
8. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
9. See, e.g., Native Ecosystems Defense Council v. Espy, 15 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1994);
Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
10. See. e.g., Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800 (11 th
Cir. 1993).
11. See. e.g., Marble Mountain Audubon Soc'y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1990).
12. DAVID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE 3 (1986). We have drawn from this
excellent work for the background information contained in this section of the article.
13. In addition to NFMA, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361
(1988) and the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988) are the other statutes that
have the greatest impact on Forest Service land management decisions.
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A. The Organic Act and Institutionalization of Timber Primacy
In 1891, Congress passed legislation giving the President the author-
ity to set aside Forest Reserves from the public domain." Over the next
several years, President Harrison used this authority to reserve about 13
million acres in several western states.1 5 These acts were largely ceremo-
nial line-drawing; no funds for management or federal control were
provided.
Congress provided a mandate for the management of the forest
reserves in 1897, when it passed legislation now referred to as the Organic
Act.16 The forest reserves were established "to improve and protect the
forest within.the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing.., a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of the citizens of the United
States.17 Congress also provided appropriations for management of the
reserves.'
8
The impetus for the creation of public forest reserves was linked to the
perceived "timber famine" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.' 9 Immense tracts of virgin timber and a growing nation's thirst
for wood fueled "cut and run" operations on a scale that today boggles the
mind. Parts of entire regions-Appalachia, the Great Lakes, and the
Ozarks, for example-were denuded in a single generation, leaving behind
a legacy of barren landscapes and impoverishment. 20 The federal forest
reserves were designed to protect the public from the ravages of the timber
industry, according to proponents, providing another Progressive cure for
the social ills of capitalism.
Initially, the creation of the reserves did not insure a steady supply of
timber; they were little more than lines on a map. Congress did not provide
more than a vague direction for management in the form of the Organic
Act. The dawning of the Forest Service, and consequently the implementa-
tion of the laws that governed public forests, occurred in 1905 when
Congress, at Gifford Pinchot's insistence, transferred the forest reserves to
the Department of Agriculture,2' named them national forests, and
14. Act of March 6, 1891, 26 Stat. 1103, repealed by 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
15. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3. at 18 n.57.
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-481 (repealed in part 1976).
17. 30 Stat. 34,35,36 as amended, now codified in part at 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1988). The Organic
Act also recognized that the forest reserves were to protect watersheds, and as a concession to western
politicians, "bona fide settlers, miners, residents and prospectors" were permitted to freely remove
timber and stone from the reserves for mining, agricultural, and domestic purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 477
(1988).
18. CLARY, supra note 12, at 2.
19. Id. at 4-28.
20. Id. at 14.
21. Transfer Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288 § 1. 33 Stat. 628. now codified at 16 U.S.C. § 472
(1988).
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created the Forest Service to manage them.22
Pinchot, a European-trained forester, Progressive politician, and
confidante of President Teddy Roosevelt, imbued the agency with a
mission: to avert a national timber famine through professional forest
management.2 3 In the process, the national forests would provide a steady
flow of timber to small communities. The robber-baron industrial concerns
that fostered cut-and-run forestry would not serve the Forest Service's
mission. Instead, European-based professional forestry management
would be the hallmark of federal forestry management.24 The commercial
sale of federal timber-a central tenet of Pinchot's concept of forest
management-became the mainstay of the agency's mission.2 5
Pinchot was removed from office for insubordination after serving just
five years as the Chief.26 His legacy-the emergence of timber manage-
ment (which included conservation and utilitarian purposes) as the
agency's primary responsibility-remains strong to this day. As one
chronicler of the Forest Service observed, "Pinchot left behind him an
organization that was thoroughly dominated by foresters with an outlook
all their own. They were on a righteous crusade to guarantee more wood for
the nation and to prevent a timber famine."2
The original legal mandate of the Forest Service, the Organic Act,
served this mission well because it provided the Forest Service with broad
latitude to develop its own management direction. Conflict over resource
use was minimal: the undeveloped national forests of the sparsely popu-
lated Western states had room for timber harvest, recreation, solitude, and
whatever else the forests had to offer. Consequently, there is a remarkable
dearth of judicial involvement with Forest Service management in the pre-
World War II era. The significant cases challenged Forest Service
regulatory authority.28 The agency almost always won, no doubt reinforc-
22. See CLARY, supra note 12, at 23-28.
23. Pinchot received his training in Europe, where the science of silviculture was well developed
by the late nineteenth century. Though timber had been commercially harvested in this country since
its earliest days, the seemingly endless timbered frontier help foster the cut-and-run mentality that
dominated commercial timber production in the nineteenth century. It was not until 1892, when
Pinchot was hired to manage the Vanderbilt estate, that silviculture was actively practiced on
American forests. See CLARY, supra note 12, at 8-9.
24. Id.
25. The Organic Act granted authority to sell timber, and the program was implemented
immediately. The first timber sale from the Forest Reserves occurred in 1898 in what is now the Black
Hills National Forest in South Dakota. See generally CLARY, supra note 12, at 30-46.
26. Pinchot was the only chief forcibly removed from office until October 1993, when the Clinton
administration forced F. Dale Robertson to transfer into another job within the Department of
Agriculture.
27. CLARY, supra note 12, at 28.
28. See. e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (upholding Forest Service
authority under the Organic Act to promulgate regulations requiring permits for grazing and imposing
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ing the righteousness of its mission.
The post-World War II years brought significant change to the
management of the national forests. Instead of a much-heralded timber
famine, there was a timber boom. The demand for housing fueled the
nation's thirst for wood products, and the Forest Service was eager to
provide the raw materials. The annual cut increased from national forests
from 2 billion board feet in 1940 to 8 billion board feet in 1959, and to 12
billion board feet in 1966, a 600 percent increase in just 26 years.2 9 This
same post-war prosperity created a more mobile and leisure-oriented
society, and recreational use of the national forests skyrocketed as well. 3 0
While the nation grew and changed, the laws governing the Forest
Service did not. The Organic Act remained the Forest Service's only legal
authority, though it was supplemented by an expanding web of administra-
tive regulations, which were created and enforced almost entirely within
the agency.3"
The legal mandate of the Forest Service changed in 1960, with the
passage of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSY).3 2 MUSY
broadens the national forests' original purpose of providing timber and
water to include the promotion and protection of recreation, wildlife, and
fish and range resources in the management of national forests.33 The
listing of the multiple-use resources in alphabetical order symbolized their
supposedly equal footing. 4 MUSY also required that the national forests
criminal penalties for violations); Light v. United States, 220 US. 523 (1911) (denying rancher's claim
that Forest Service must either fence Forest Reserves or allow them to be used as public rangeland).
29. COGGINS ET AL, supra note 6, at 606 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENsus, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OFTHE UNITED STATES, SERIES L 15-23, 534 (1970)). The increase in timber production
was justified as part of-the timber famine mentality addressed earlier in this article. For example, in
1958, Forest Service Chief Richard E. McArdle opined that the Forest Service perceived the nation as
having a permanent expanding market for wood products, and that the nation would require 24 billion
board feet from the national forests by the year 2000. CLARY. supra note 12, at 158.
30. See generally CLARY, supra note 12, at 147-68. The increased demand for amenity resources
led to the implementation of the "multiple use" concept embodied in MUSY. which was introduced in
1956 and passed by Congress in 1960. Recreational use of the national forests continues to grow
dramatically. Recreational Visitor Days (defined as a 12 hour period of recreational use on a national
forest) increased from 150,725,900 in 1966 to 295,473,000 in 1993. FOREST SERVICE RI M REPORT ON
RECREATIONAL USE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. (1966 & 1993).
31. Forest Service policies and land management practices are governed by the Forest Service
Manual and the Forest Service Handbook, both of which are multi-volume sets consisting of thousands
of pages of internal regulations. Neither the Handbook nor the Manual are promulgated by formal or
informal rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act, but are developed and implemented
entirely within the agency. The Manual and Handbook had their genesis in the early 1900s. stemming
from the Forest Reserve Manual (a publication of the General Land Office) and Gifford Pinchot's Use
Book, first published in 1905. See CLARY, supra note 12, at 30.
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 528.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 528. This alphabetical listing represents a classic case of form over substance,
with the Forest Service taking pains to show its sensitivity to recreation by calling it "outdoor
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be managed on a sustained yield basis, "without impairment of the
productivity of the land.""a In practice, the statute did not change the
agency's emphasis on timber production.36
MUSY has been labeled "an attempt to deal with realities of a new
age-one of which was that the clients of the national forests were
many."37 It did provide statutory recognition for non-consumptive re-
sources such as fish, wildlife, and recreation, and was actively supported by
the agency. 38 However, MUSY did not provide standards by which those
dissatisfied with Forest Service decisions could successfully challenge
them in court. The oft-quoted passage from Perkins v. Bergland 3 -that
MUSY "breathe[s] discretion at every pore"O-summarizes judicial
review under MUSY. As with the Organic Act, the agency has been
remarkably successful in the handful of challenges to its authority under
MUSY.41 MUSY remains on the books, though it is largely a statutory
anachronism, supplanted by the more explicit and detailed dictates of the
NFMA.42
B. The Seeds of Change
The mid-1960s and early 1970s was a time of great change and
ferment in this country. The environmental movement emerged during this
period, and became a political and social force in this country. Symbolized
by the first Earth Day on April 1, 1970, the greening of America eventually
recreation," so it would be listed first. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 6, at 622.
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 531(a), (b).
36. The fact that the annual harvest from the national forests increased from 8 billion board feet
in 1959 to 12 billion board feet in 1966 is a good example of the agency's priorities during this period,
despite the rhetoric embodied in MUSY. See generally CLARY, supra note 12, at 156-65.
37. CLARY, supra note 12, at 163.
38. Id. at 154-56.
39. 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Perkins, 608 F.2d at 807.
41. See, e.g.. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 123 (D. Alaska 1971) ("Congress has given
no indication as to the weight to be assigned to each [multiple-use] value, and it must be assumed that
the decision as to the proper mix of uses within any particular area is left to the sound discretion and
expertise of the Forest Service."). This case was remanded by the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished
opinion, Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 E.L.R. 20292 (9th Cir. 1973), for further findings as to whether the
Forest Service had indeed given "due consideration" to values other than timber harvest. See also
National Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931,938 (D. Or. 1984), appeal dismissed.
801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986); Dorothy Thomas Found. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D.N.C.
1970).
It should be noted that the Forest Service has been succersful in defending challenges to MUSY
brought by the timber industry as well as by environmental groups. See, e.g., Intermountain Forest
Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988).
42. MUSY is still alive, but largely useless for litigation from both the industry and
environmental perspectives. Recent decisions continue to affirm itstatus as a "statement of principle"
with no legal teeth. See. e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see also
Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988).
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had a profound impact on the Forest Service - and the role of the courts in
forest management.
The emergence of the modern environmental movement is reflected in
the rash of environmental legislation spawned during this period: the
Endangered Species Acts (ESA) of 1969 and 1973,'43 the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)," the Wilderness Act,4I the National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA),," the Clean Air Act,'4 and the
Clean Water Act.48 Some of these laws, such as NEPA and the ESA, had
an immediate impact on the way that the Forest Service did business.
NEPA in particular opened the door for greater public involvement-and
challenge-to Forest Service decisions. 9
The demand for greater accountability from the Forest Service was
also coming from Congress. In 1969, Senator Metcalf from Montana
requested that a faculty committee from the University of Montana,
headed by then-dean of the Forestry School, Arnold Bolle, investigate
timber harvest practices on the nearby Bitterroot National Forest. 50
Persistent citizen complaints about excessive clearcutting on the nearby
Bitterroot National Forest provided the impetus for the investigation. 1
The Bitterroot is quintessential Montana: a broad valley dominated by
ranches, blessed with abundant water and surrounded by stunning moun-
tains, the latter of which are part of the Bitterroot National Forest. Local
citizens were concerned about the degradation of the landscape and water
quality caused by the rapid increase in timber production."
Bolle and his Forestry School colleagues toured the forest, met with
local citizens, conservation groups, Forest Service officials, and profes-
sional foresters. 53 The committee issued its report-now known as The
Bolle Report-to Senator Metcalf in November of 1970 with little
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1988).
45. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988).
46. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
48. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
49. Environmentalists quickly applied NEPA to timber sale decisions. For example, the
plaintiffs in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F.Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973).
affd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), requested an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for timber
sales in the Superior National Forest's Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The Forest Service balked, and
suit was filed. The result was an unequivocal determination that timber sales, because of their adverse
affect on the environment, triggered NEPA's requirement that the responsible federal agency prepare
an EIS. Id. at 1323-24.
50. Bolle, supra note 2, at 1, 8. Dean Bolle provides an entertaining first-hand account of the
Bitterroot controversy and events leading to the passage of the NFMA.
51. Id. at 5-8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 8-10.
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foresight as to the uproar it would create.5 4
The report was critical of the agency's overemphasis on timber
production (in violation of the multiple use mandate) and its reliance on
clearcutting 5 In the words of Dean Bolle: "[C]learcuts were the symbol
which drew the criticism. The real problem was timber primacy, which
now dominated and controlled Forest Service activity. This marked a clear
departure from the broader Congressional policy of multiple use as earlier
conceived."56
The Bolle Report aroused nationwide concern for forestry practices
on public lands, and was a catalyst for the 1972 Senate hearings on
clearcutting chaired by the late Senator Frank Church of Idaho.5 7 It
vindicated concerns expressed by environmental groups over clearcutting
and Forest Service mismanagement of public lands, not only in Montana,
but in other parts of the country as well. The Church hearings58 foreshad-
owed a statutory change in the Forest Service legal mandate, from the
broad, discretionary delegation of authority in the Organic Act and
MUSY to a more precise directive. The focus of the hearings was the
Forest Service's overemphasis on timber production and the increasingly
vocal public concern over resource damage stemming from clearcutting5
The product of those hearings, the Church Guidelines, 0 marked a new role
for Congress in the management of the National Forests.
The Church Guidelines contained a number of specific limitations on
timber harvest practices, including the size of clearcuts, a regeneration
requirement, and protection for soil and watersheds.6 " These guidelines
became the framework for many of the substantive provisions of the
NFMA, some of which were incorporated verbatim.62 Although Congress
never enacted the Church Guidelines into law, the Fifth Circuit relied on
54. Id. at 10-13. "To our surprise, the report became a hot local and national issue," Dean Bolle
wrote. Id. at 11.
55. Id. at 9-10; U.S. FOREST SERVICE, MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ON THE BITTERROOT: A TASK
FORCE APPRAISAL, FILES 1500 & 2470 (May 1969 - April 1970) (available from the Forest Service
Region One office, Missoula, Mont.) [hereinafter THE BOLLE REPORT].
56. Bolle, supra note 2, at 11.
57. Id. at 11-14.
58. See SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., CLEARCUTTING ON FEDERAL TIMBERLANDS (Comm. Print 1972)
reprinted in FOREST AND RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: JOINT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
ENVIRONMENT, SOIL CONSERVATION, AND FORESTRY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND
FORESTRY AND THE SUBCOMM. ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND RESOURCES OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 953-54 (Comm. Print 1976)). [hereinafter
CHURCH SUBCOMM. REPORT].
59. See generally id.
60. See generally id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E), (F) (1988).
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them to allow clearcutting,6 3 and the Ninth Circuit referred to them as
congressionally mandated restrictions on "timbering practices to be used
on all national forests pending the development of permanent NFMA
guidelines." 4 In the words of one court, "the Church guidelines are the
outer boundary of the Forest Service's discretion and are judicially
enforceable."6 5
Part of the concern over forest management stemmed from a
perceived lack of uniform planning for all resources. Congress responded
with the Forest Rangeland and Renewable Resources Planning Act of
1974 (RPA).66 In contrast to the management-oriented nature of the
Church Guidelines, the RPA was designed to foster uniform planning by
the Forest Service for all resources on a nationwide basis. It requires an
assessment of renewable resources every ten years, 67 a program setting out
long-term objectives as well as short-term costs, 8 and an annual report
comparing the agency's actions with those forecast in the program. 9 The
RPA also contained provisions directing the President to submit informa-
tion to Congress relative to the agency's budget and resource outputs. 0
The RPA represents an attempt to instill centralized planning for the
Forest Service at the national level.7' However, as one commentator
63. Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978). cert. denied,
439 U.S. 966 (1978).
64. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 775 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Texas Comm. on Natural
Resources, 573 F.2d at 209-10).
65. National Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931,937 (D. Or. 1984). appeal
dismissed, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986). In this litigation, known as the Mapleton case, the Forest
Service took the position that its 1979 Timber Resource Plan was exempt from both the Church
Guidelines, which it claimed were unenforceable, and the NFMA, which it argued did not apply until
after the Suislaw Forest adopted its Forest Plan. Id. at 936-37. The court rejected this "falling through
the cracks" argument, id. at n.13, but relied on NEPA rather than the NFMA in enjoining timber
harvests under the Timber Resource Plan. Id. at 944.
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (1988) (as amended).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1601.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(c).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1606(c).
71. Tension exists between the RPA, with its centralized planning requirements emanating
from the Washington, D.C. office of the Forest Service, and the forest plans developed on each local
forest under NFMA. This conflict surfaced in a debate during the 1980s as to whether the Forest
Service was required to engage in "top down" planning, by taking the RPA targets for timber, and
distributing them to the individual forest plans, or "bottom up" planning, where harvesting targets
were generated locally as a result of information gathered during the planning process. For a more
detailed discussion of the relation between RPA and NFMA, see Wilkinson & Anderson.supra note 3,
at 76-90. They conclude that Congress wanted a "bottom up" planning process implemented through
the NFMA, with timber targets derived from local plans, rather than a nationally mandated harvest
level. Id. at 90. Critics of the NFMA mandated forest planning process charged that the Forest Service
continued to use a "top down" planning process, whereby harvest levels contained in forest plans were
derived from national targets and rationalized through the planning process. RANDAL O'Tooti,
REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 23, 55-58 (1986).
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observed, "Despite high (and in retrospect idealistic) expectations, the
RPA has not fundamentally altered the Forest Service budget or budget-
ary politics in the White House or Congress." 72 Litigation aimed at forcing
more funds for non-commodity programs based on the RPA has been
unsuccessful.73
Neither the Church Guidelines nor the RPA quelled the public outcry
over clearcutting. The Natural Resources Defense Council targeted the
Forest Service for litigation over the practice, and a test case was brought
on the Monongahela National Forest. The result, West Virginia Division
of the Izaak Walton League ofAmerica v. Butz, 74 is widely regarded as the
catalyst for the passage of NFMA. 75 The Fourth Circuit's declaration that
clearcutting violated the plain language of the Organic Act 76 jeopardized
the entire timber sale program.77
The NFMA was introduced into Congress, debated extensively, and
passed less than two years later. The statute embodied concerns expressed
in the Bolle Report and embraced the work of the Church subcommittee 78
by placing limits on clearcutting and offering specific protection for soil,
fish, and water quality. It thereby garnered the support of the conservation
community. 79 The timber industry supported language repealing those
portions of the Organic Act that prevented clearcutting, thereby rendering
Monongahela impotent.80
In the authors' opinion, the debate over top-down versus bottom-up planning has been mooted by
on-the-ground realities (less timber than estimated), budget constraints (less money), and restrictions
caused by other laws, chiefly the Endangered Species Act. Many national forests are producing far less
timber than envisioned under RPA or NFMA. For example, the Bitterroot Forest Plan, adopted in
1987, set an Allowable Sale Quantity of 33.4 million board feet, which was essentially the same as the
RPA target for the Bitterroot National Forest. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FOREST PLAN RECORD OF
DECISION, BITTERROOT NAT'L FOREST 6 (1987); U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FOREST PLAN, BITTERROOT
NAT'L FOREST V-10 (1987) [hereinafter BITTERROOT FOREST PLAN] (copies on file with author).
Timber harvest levels have been significantly lower than the ASQ since the forest plan was
implemented. For example, in 1990, the Bitterroot Forest offered only 7.9 million board feet and sold
only 3.4 million board feet. (Statistics compiled by the author based on information provided by the
Bitterroot National Forest).
72. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 6, at 631.
73. National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
74. 367 F. Supp. 422 (D.W.Va. 1973), aff'd, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter
Monongahela].
75. See Bolle, supra note 2, at 15; Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 155.
76. Monongahela, 522 F.2d at 949-50.
77. While the Fourth Circuit's holding was binding only upon the agency in the Southeast, suits
were brought in other areas of the country. See, e.g., Zieske v. Butz, 406 F. Supp. 258 (D. Alaska 1975).
The Fourth Circuit's holding was easily applied to timber sales throughout the National Forest System.
78. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 155-159.
79. Id. at 158 n.814.
80. Clearcutting is not forbidden under N FMA, as it was under Monongahela. See generally 16
U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F). It is subject to several limitations, the judicial enforcement of which is
analyzed infra Section If(A)(4).
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Conceptually, NFMA can be divided into two parts, one procedural
and the other substantive. First, Congress mandated that the agency
embark on a nationwide forest planning process for each of 156 separate
units of the National Forest System.8 The planning process was to be
conducted in accordance with NEPA,82 thus insuring formal public
involvement. Forest planners were directed to use an interdisciplinary
approach, incorporating the full range of natural sciences in to the
process.8 3 The forest plans, as they are now known, were to be completed by
September 30, 1985, and revised periodically thereafter." Once com-
pleted, the forest plans were to serve as blueprints for all future manage-
ment projects, such as timber sales, which must be consistent with the
forest plan.85
While no two forest plans are exactly the same, they all share basic
features. A forest plan is akin to a zoning map, with the entire forest divided
into various zones or "Management Areas." Each Management Area
contains standards and guidelines that control the type of activity that may
occur. For example, on the Beaverhead National Forest in southwestern
Montana, Management Areas are denoted for wildlife winter range,
riparian areas, semi-primitive recreation, and timber production/wild-
life.86 In some Management Areas, timber harvest is forbidden; in others, it
takes a back seat to wildlife needs; in others, it is the dominant use. 7 The
forest plan also contains standards and guidelines, which apply to all
Management Areas within the forest.
81. 16 U.S.C. 1604(a).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1); see also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 775 (9th Cir. 1982)
(NFMA does not exempt the Forest Service from NEPA review).
83. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(b), (0(3).
84. 16 U.S.C § 1604(c).
85. 16U.S.C.§ 1604(i); see also Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970,
977 (D. Colo. 1989) (stating that implementation of plans is achieved through individual projects,
which must be consistent with the forest plan).
86. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, BEAVERHEAD NAT'L FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGFOMENr
PLAN III (1986) [hereinafter BEAVERHEAD FOREST PLAN].
87. See, e.g., id. The Beaverhead Forest Plan uses a format similar to many other forest plans. It
cntains a set of forest-wide management goals, standards, and objectives. The plan divides the forest
into 29 separate Management Areas (MAs), "each with different management goals, resource
potential and limitations." Id. at III-1. Each of the Management Areas contains a separate set of
additional standards that, in theory, complement the goals and objectives of that particular
Management Area. For example, MA #8 consists of 366,740 acres with high wilderness and
.recreational values. MA #8 lands are not, however, designated wilderness. MA #8 has a standard that
does not allow any new road construction, or commercial timber harvest, Id. at 111-20-25. By contrast,
MA #16, which comprises 159,492 acres, is characterized as suitable for timber production, and
contains a standard that allows timber harvest to be scheduled on suitable lands, and allows road
construction to support management activities. Id. at 111-48-5 1. Another Management Area, MA #11,
consists of 24,716 acre of riparian lands. MA #11 has a standard that allows timber harvesting, but
only on MA #11 lands area adjacent to other MAs where commercial timber harvest is prohibited. Id.
at 111-35.
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NFMA also contains a wide range of unprecedented substantive
restrictions on timber harvest. Many of these were to be implemented
along with forest plans. Clearcutting is recognized as a legitimate method
of timber harvest, but may be used only where it is determined to be the
"optimum method." 88 Strict limitations are placed on the size of clearcuts,
and protection must be provided for soil and watersheds.89 In addition,
Congress required that harvest units be able to achieve regeneration within
five years.90
Congress also reaffirmed both the multiple-use and sustained-yield
concepts of MUSY 91 and recognized wilderness as one of those uses. 2 The
principle of sustained-yield timber harvest was more precisely defined as
non-declining even flow under a separate statutory provision. 3 Other
substantive provisions include a requirement that "unsuitable lands" be
excluded from harvest,94 that forest roads be constructed in a cost-effective
manner, 95 and that the national forests maintain biological diversity. 0
Overall, the NFMA signaled a dramatic departure from seven
decades of nearly unbridled administrative discretion in managing the
National Forest System. It can be seen as an attempt to control "timber
primacy" within the agency. After the passage of NFMA, forest manage-
ment decisions would receive much greater scrutiny from within the
agency, by outside interest groups, and ultimately, by the courts.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Judicial Review of Substantive NFMA Provisions
Unlike NEPA, NFMA has substantive as well as procedural require-
ments.97 These include limitations on determining whether land is suitable
for timber harvesting, 8 limitations on the use of even-aged management, 9
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(F)(iii), (v).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1).
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1); 36 C.F.R. § 219.3 (1993).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1608(a).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1604; Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 69 (NFMA "fundamentally
altered the traditional relationship between Congress, the Courts, and the Forest Service by adding
procedural requirements for planning and by imposing substantive restrictions on timber harvest in the
national forests"). The Forest Service argued in Sierra Club v. Espy that the NFMA was only a
"planning statute" with "no substantive component." 822 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Tex. 1993). The
court disagreed: "[T]he NFMA does erect unambiguous, substantive 'outer boundaries' on the Forest
Service's discretion in terms of forest management valuations (i.e., the setting of agency goals or 'ends')
and concomitant, consistent practices." Id.
98. This includes limitations regarding soils, slope, watershed, and restocking. See generally 16
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and specific requirements for insuring diversity of plant and animal
communities.100 Dean Arnold Bolle, author of the 1970 Bolle Report, said
a few years ago, "When the NFMA was enacted in 1976, I had a great
feeling of accomplishment. I felt that the law clearly stated what must and
must not be done."101 Many participants in the legislative process believed
that NFMA imposed unprecedented limitations on forestry practices,
particularly the controversial practice of clearcutting, and mandated
consideration of resources such as wildlife, water, and recreation in timber-
management decisions.10 2
NFMA covers five general substantive areas: diversity of plant and
animal communities,103 monitoring and assessment of management prac-
tices on land productivity,10 4 conditions under which the Forest Service can
increase harvest levels,10 5 suitability guidelines for timber harvesting,1
and limitations on the use of even-aged management. 07 Some of these have
been the basis for several forest plan or timber sale challenges; others have
never been raised in litigation. We shall analyze each substantive provi-
sion, the implementing regulations, and the reported cases involving that
section, and will then discuss the potential for future challenges under
these provisions.108
U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v).
100. 16U.S.C.§ 1604(g)(3)(B). The regulations interpret this section to require that "habitat
shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate
species." 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
101. Bole, supra note 2, at 5-9.
102. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 40 ("The 1976 Act amounted to a bitterly-
contested referendum on Forest Service timber harvesting practices.").The famous decision enjoining
the Forest Service from using clearcutting was West Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton League of America
v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), more commonly known as Monongahela.
NFMA is not the first statute to mention wildlife as a co-equal factor in forest management;
MUSY mentions it as well. 16 U.S.C. § 528 ("It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests
are established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife
and fish purposes...."); see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 285-87. But MUSY simply
recites policy goals; it places no substantive restrictions on timber harvesting. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-
31. Judicial review under MUSY has rarely resulted in any change in planned management action.
See, e.g.. Sierra Clubv. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971) (upholding the Forest Service sale of
8.7 billion board feet of timber from the Tongass National Forest);see also National Wildlife Fd'n v.
U.S. Forest Service, 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984), appeal dismissed. 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C).
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(D).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E).
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F).
108. We will focus exclusively on 16 U.S.C. § 1604, which addresses forest planning.
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1. Ensuring Diversity - § 1604(g)(3)(B)
a) The Statute and Regulations
NFMA requires that the implementing regulations specify guidelines
to:
provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on
the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to
meet overall multiple-use objectives, and within the multiple-use
objectives of a land management plan adopted pursuant to this
section, provide, where appropriate, to the degree practicable, for
steps to be taken to preserve the diversity of tree species similar to
that existing in the region controlled by the plan.109
The statute does not define diversity; that job was left to the
Committee of Scientists and the Forest Service.110 The regulations
translate the statute into two overall management directives: first, that
viable populations of existing forest vertebrates be maintained and well
distributed; and second, that the Forest Service designate certain verte-
brate and/or invertebrate species whose population changes are believed to
indicate the effects of management activities as Management Indicator
Species (MIS)." Furthermore,
[m]anagement prescriptions, where appropriate and to the
extent practicable, shall preserve and enhance the diversity of
plant and animal communities ... so that it is at least as great as
that which would be expected in a natural forest and the diversity
of tree species similar to that existing in the planning area.
This regulation makes clear that the Forest Service may reduce the
diversity of plant, animal and tree species "only where needed to meet
overall multiple-use objectives.""' The planners must justify such a
decision with "an analysis showing biological, economic, social, and
environmental design consequences, and the relation of such conversions to
the process of natural change." 1 4
Although neither the statute nor the definition of diversity in the
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
110. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 296. The Committee of Scientists was convened to
advise the Forest Service on suggested regulations, as required by statute. See Id.; 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604((h)(1).
111. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19; see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 297 (citing an
additional management directive that timber harvesting practices be changed if they result in fish
habitat changes).
112. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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regulations' refers to "viability" or "viable populations," the regulations
state that "[f]ish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in
the planning area."' The ambiguity of the regulations-one of which
imposes a strict duty on the Forest Service, the other of which appears to
mitigate that duty considerably-has led to varying interpretations of the
Forest Service's responsibility in regards to diversity of both tree species
and wildlife.
b) The Intent of the Diversity Provision
The diversity section of NFMA is conceptually linked to even-aged
management limitations. Both reflect the clearcutting controversy out of
which the NFMA arose. Congress was concerned about the lack of
consideration accorded wildlife and other resources in timber management
decisions, or what Dean Bolle has referred to as "timber primacy." 127 To
interpret 1970s congressional concerns in 1990s language, Congress was
concerned about the loss of diverse ecosystems. Nonetheless, while
Congress was willing to require consideration and, in some cases, mainte-
nance of other resources in timber-management decisions,118 it was
unwilling to flatly prohibit even-aged management, even where it would
reduce the natural diversity of plant and animal life. Instead, Congress
conferred substantial discretion on scientific experts within the Forest
Service and on the Committee of Scientists to determine the best course for
on-the-ground timber-management decisions. Congress did, however,
safeguard against possible Forest Service bias in favor of timber harvesting
by requiring the regulation-promulgating Committee of Scientists to be
non-Forest Service employees.'
c) Litigation Involving the Diversity Section
The diversity provision has been the basis for numerous challenges to
115. 36 C.F.R. § 219.3.
116. 36C.F.R.§ 219.19 (defining a viable population as "onewhich has the estimated numbers
and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence is well distributed in the
planning area").
117. Bolle, supra note 2, at 11.
118. See. e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) ("the Secretary shall assure that (forests) provide for
multiple use and sustained yield ... and, in particular, include coordination of outdoor recreation.
range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness .... "); 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B)
(diversity provision); 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v) (requiring clearcuts to be "consistent with the
protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and esthetic resources").
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1). The Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee report stated.
"The Committee believes that this technical advisory committee will help assure a broad based,
interdisciplinary, technical review." S. REP. No. 893,94th Cong., 2d sss. 36 (1976), reprintedin 1976
U.S.S.C.A.N. 6662, 6695.
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forest plans in the Northwest alleging the plans' failure to maintain viable
populations of spotted owls.' 2' District courts have also addressed the
diversity requirement of NFMA in regards to species other than spotted
owls, and more generally, in regards to general diversity of trees as well as
wildlife. 2' The Ninth Circuit is the only appellate court to have inter-
preted the diversity requirements of NFMA. Its interpretations in the
spotted owl litigation have been generally favorable for environmental-
group plaintiffs. No conclusions can necessarily be drawn from that fact, as
the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed some of the more difficult questions
regarding NFMA and diversity.
The Ninth Circuit has addressed important issues, however. For
example, it has held that the NFMA diversity requirement applies to
species listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA). 22 The Forest Service argument was a syllogism: the regula-
tions require the agency to maintain a viable population of owls; a listed
species is no longer viable; the spotted owl was listed under the ESA;
therefore, NFMA no longer applied and the agency did not have to plan for
viability of the owl in its forest plans. 23 Neither the district court nor the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the agency's reasoning, however.1 24 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the Forest Service must
revise its standards and guidelines to ensure the owl's viability and prepare
an environmental impact statement in compliance with NEPA and
NFMA. 125 The appeals court also affirmed the district court's order
120. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle
Audubon Soc'yv. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992), affd, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993);
Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991), aff d, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir.
1991). For an excellent detailed overview of the spotted owl litigation, see Victor Sher, Travels with
Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PuB. LAND L. Rav. 41 (1993).
121. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (focusing on biological
diversity of tree species); Krichbaum v. Kelley, 844 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Va. 1994) (holding that even-
aged management can create diversity); Oregon Natural Resources v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Or.
1993) (addressing Forest Service duty to designate certain woodpeckers as management indicator
species); Sharps v. U.S. Forest Service, 823 F. Supp. 668 (D. S.D. 1993) (plaintiff challenging agency
decision that would result in loss of black-tailed prairie dogs); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp.
1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992) [hereinafter Robertson III] (focusing primarily on diversity of tree species);
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 784 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Ark. 1991) [hereinafter Robertson 11] (holding that
NFMA does not require diversity of plants and animals within each sale area).
122. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297,301-02 (9th Cir. 1991). This holding was a
relatively easy one for the court to reach, based upon the plain language of NFMA and the ESA.
Another situation in which it was relatively easy for courts to refuse to defer to the agency
interpretation of NFMA was the Forest Service's use of a seven-year restocking standard in a forest
plan; the statute clearly specifies a five-year standard. Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D.
Colo. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993); see infra notes 224-30 and
accompanying text.
123, Evans, 952 F.2d at 301-302.
124. Id., affig 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
125. Id. at 298.
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permanently enjoining timber sales in owl habitat until such a plan was
prepared."' 6
i) The Agency's Affirmative Duty to Protect Wildlife
After the Forest Service prepared an owl management plan and an
accompanying Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), plaintiffs
again sued, alleging violations of both NEPA and NFMA. The district
court held for the plaintiffs under NEPA. In one of the most significant
NFMA decisions to date, the court relied on NFMA to articulate the
Forest Service's duty to protect wildlife.127 The court found that the FEIS
violated NEPA because it failed to explain or justify the finding that the
selected alternative would result in a "low to medium-low probability of
providing for viable populations of late-successional forest associated
wildlife species other than northern spotted owls," 1 28 which would in turn
violate NFMA.2 9 The NFMA requirement was clear, according to the
court: section 1604(g) (3) (B) "confirms the Forest Service's duty to protect
wildlife.""" The court stated that, "To adopt a plan that would preserve a
management indicator species ("MIS"), such as the spotted owl, in a way
that exterminated other vertebrate species would defeat the purpose of
monitoring to assure general wildlife viability." 131 The court enjoined all
timber sales in spotted owl habitat pending completion of a supplemental
EIS and established a timetable for completion of the EIS.131
This interpretation of NFMA means that land management plans
must take into account the entire spectrum of vertebrate species in the area
covered by the plan, and must not allow the diminution of any of those
species.13  This is one of the more complex issues raised under NFMA, as
126. Id. These decisions had an enormous impact on timber harvesting in the Northwest. leading
to congressional exemptions from the injunction for certain forests, Northwest Timber Compromise.
Dep'tof the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121. § 318,103Stat.
745 (1989), and a "timber summit" in Portland, Oregon, which was facilitated by President Bill
Clinton. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
127. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-90 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
128. Id. at 1488.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1489.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1493. The decision has been appealed by both the defendants and the plaintiffs; the
Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in late 1992, but no decision has yet been issued. Sher, supra note
120, at 75.
133. In Moseley, the court indicated that NEPA requires only an adequate explanation of the
agency's choice. 798 F. Supp. at 1492-93 (enforcing Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans. 771 F. Supp.
1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991), af'd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991)). However, thtcourt's discussion of the
Forest Service's duties under NFMA does not appear to provide much room for making any but the
"right" choice, i.e., one which will ensure the viability of the spotted owl. See id. at 1489-90. This is
where a procedural statute differs significantly from a substantive one: when interpreted literally, a
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the statute and regulations offer ambiguous guidance. For instance, the
regulations require planners to identify MIS, which are described as those
species whose "population changes are believed to indicate the effects of
management activities." '134 The purpose of using MIS is to "estimate the
effects of each [management] alternative on fish and wildlife popula-
tions."' 5 If NFMA is violated by a management alternative that will not
adversely affect the MIS, such as the spotted owl, but will affect other
species, one may reasonably wonder why planners must bother designating
MIS.
To answer that, the district court looked to Congress' intent in
enacting NFMA, namely, to treat wildlife as a "controlling, co-equal
factor in forest management.' 3 6 It also relied on Wilkinson and Anderson,
who state that "[t]he use of MIS in no way diminishes the requirement to
maintain well-distributed, viable populations of existing vertebrates; in
fact, proper use of MIS should help to ensure them."'' 3 7 But neither the
district court nor Wilkinson and Anderson address the more difficult issue,
i.e., what happens if it is not possible to maintain viable populations of both
an MIS and other species.' 3 8 Furthermore, the district court omitted any
mention of the regulation which allows for reductions in diversity if such
reductions will further "overall multiple-use objectives."' 3 9 If the Forest
Service were to adduce expert evidence that maintaining viable popula-
tions of all vertebrate species is impossible, or that reducing the viability of
certain species would further multiple-use objectives, the court would face
a situation in which it may be difficult not to defer to the agency's
interpretation. 140 However, even then, if the court followed Judge Dwyer's
interpretation of the Forest Service's duty to protect wildlife, it could
substantive statute lacking phrases such as "to the degree practicable" or "as is feasible" does not allow
for environmental degradation. There is no balancing test to be done by the court, nor any discretion to
be exercised by the agency. Congress has spoken. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978).
134. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1).
135. Id.
136. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. at 1489 (citing Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 296).
137. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. at 1489 (citing Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 300).
138. Theoretically, this should not happen. Management indicator species are selected by
habitat type; e.g., the spotted owl is an MIS because it is an old-growth dependent species. If the MIS
remains viable, then presumably the habitat upon which the species depend is healthy. That in turn is
supposed to suggest that other old-growth dependent species are also viable. Sometimes, preserving an
old-growth species, or late-successional forest species, may result in lower viability for early-succession
forest species. But in Moseley, the FEIS for the chosen management alternative specifically stated
there was a "low to medium-low probability of providing for viable populations of late-successional
forest species other than northern spotted owls." Moseley, 798 F. Supp. at 1488 (emphasis added).
139. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g).
140. Traditionally, the court will not substitute its judgment, or that of a plaintiff's expert, for
that of an agency expert. See generally infra notes 565-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of
judicial deference to agency fact-finding.
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conceivably forbid any management action whatsoever. That is the
potential power of a substantive statute: even under a deferential standard
of review, the statute places clear limitations on the agency's discretion.
Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, if upheld on appeal, will have
far-reaching consequences in forests throughout the Ninth Circuit. But the
limitations on diversity may not be as clear as the district court in Moseley
portrayed them. The language of 36 C.F.R. section 219.27(g) allows for
substantial agency discretion to make decisions that could adversely affect
diversity. The Forest Service did not offer evidence of either the impossibil-
ity of maintaining viable populations of spotted owls and other vertebrate
species or of the necessity for reducing diversity to meet other multiple-use
objectives at the district-court level. Without such evidence, the Ninth
Circuit is likely to affirm, especially if the court follows its approach in
Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, where it addressed NFMA's applica-
bility to a threatened or endangered species.1 41 In Evans, like the district
court in Moseley, the Ninth Circuit looked at the underlying consequences
of the Forest Service's position and concluded that the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute was "directly contrary to the legislative purpose of the
National Forest Management Act." 142 In Moseley, too, the court can
safely rely on the underlying intent of NFMA to uphold the broad duty
imposed by the district court on the Forest Service to protect wildlife as
well as sell timber.
Even if the Ninth Circuit were to include the qualifying language of
36 C.F.R. section 219.27 (g) in its analysis, it would not dilute the agency's
duty to protect wildlife; the duty would simply have to be balanced against
the agency's concurrent duty to meet other multiple-use objectives. More
importantly, the regulation itself may be an incorrect interpretation of the
statute. Ultimately, Judge Dwyer is correct in reading the NFMA and its
regulations the way that he did. Absent such a duty on the part of the Forest
Service, the NFMA is rendered impotent.
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe provides an example of a
more deferential judicial interpretation. 43 In Lowe, plaintiffs alleged that
the Forest Service violated the NFMA diversity requirements by adopting
a forest plan amendment which did not ensure the viability of old-growth
indicator species.'4 4 Plaintiffs also alleged that the agency violated its
141. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
142. Evans, 952 F.2d at 301. This is an example of a court's refusal to defer to an agency's
interpretation of its implementing statute. It suggests how extreme an agency's interpretation must be
before a court will refuse to defer to it.
143. 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Or. 1993).
144. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. at 730, 733. The species to which plaintiffs were referring were the
pileated woodpecker, goshawk, and three-toed woodpecker, all of which were designated MIS in the
original forest plan. Id. at 730. Plaintiffs also made several NEPA claims. Id.
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regulations by failing to designate the white-headed and black-backed
woodpeckers as MIS.'45
Although the court stated that "NFMA imposes a substantive duty on
the Forest Service to provide sufficient habitat" for viable species, 146 it then
compared NFMA to MUSY in terms of the "wide discretion" given the
Forest Service to manage the national forests. 47 The court concluded that
the Forest Service had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in meeting the
MIS habitat requirements or in selecting the MIS.'48 The court did not list
its reasons for finding that the agency had complied with the statute, but
simply referred to the findings in the agency's brief.'49
This type of unquestioning judicial review, in which the court does not
critically analyze either the statute and regulations or the agency action,
strips substantive statutes of their meaning and renders judicial review a
mere procedural exercise. The Lowe court concluded without discussion
that plaintiffs have "failed to show any arbitrary and capricious violations
of the regulations pertaining to wildlife habitat."'150 But failure to ensure
viability of a wildlife species may very well violate NFMA. At the very
least, plaintiff's claim was not frivolous and deserved more critical judicial
analysis.
ii) Diversity Should Apply to Projects as Well as Plans
In Sierra Club v. Robertson (Robertson II), plaintiffs challenged two
timber sales, alleging four violations of NFMA.' 51 Plaintiffs contended
that the Forest Service must maintain diversity within each sale compart-
meit, and that the agency had failed to study the effects of even-aged
management on diversity in the sale area. 52 The defendants asserted, and
the court agreed, that NFMA does not require diversity within each sale
145. Id. at 730 (claiming a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1)).
146. Id. at 729.
147. Id. at 733 (citing the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSY), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
(1988), and Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 686 F. Supp. 256, 264 (D. Mont. 1988)).
However, the section in Big Hole Ranchers on which the Oregon court relied involved an interpretation
of MUSY, not NFMA. Id. The discretionary power under MUSY is commonly acknowledged. See
Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (MUSY "breathes discretion at every pore").
But it was that very broad discretion which led to the restrictions on timber harvesting in the NFMA.
See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 69-75.
148. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. at 734.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 733.
151. Robertson 11, 784 F. Supp. at 593. The plaintiffs' NFMA claims included even-aged
management, inventory, wetlands, and diversity claims. In addition to deferential review, another
factor that may have played a role in Robertson was the relatively small size of the proposed sales areas.
A shelterwood sale was scheduled for 40 acres, and a thinning program was scheduled for 122 acres.
See also Cronin v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990) (26 acres to be logged).
152. Robertson II, 784 F. Supp. at 609.
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area, but only within the entire area covered by the forest plan."'3 A similar
issue arose in Sharps v. U.S. Forest Service, where the plaintiff, a wildlife
biologist, appealed a decision memo implementing an earlier decision that
changed district management of the black-tailed prairie dog.'" The
plaintiff, who conducted research in the area, claimed that the manage-
ment decision violated the diversity requirement of NFMA and the
NFMA regulations.1 55 The court ruled for the Forest Service because the
prairie-dog management plan covered only a district, not a forest or a
region. 158 The court held that the NFMA regulation requiring fish and
wildlife habitat to be managed to maintain viable populations of vertebrate
species 15  applies only to forest and regional plans, because these are
"planning areas."1 58
The regulations protect against significant loss of diversity from
particular timber sales by requiring viable populations to be maintained
throughout the "planning area."15' 9 Courts should follow the regulations
and allow reductions of diversity in sale areas only where those reductions
will not result in a decrease in the "estimated numbers and distribution of
reproductive individuals" needed to ensure that the species continues to
exist throughout the planning area.160
153. Id. The size of the sale area is probably relevant to such a determination. In Robertson 11,
the challenged sales included a 40-acre shelterwood sale, a 61-acre shelterwood sale, and 87 acres of
prescribed burning. Id. at 597, 600.
The Arkansas district court also addressed diversity in Robertson I11. which involved the same
parties as Robertson IL Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992). There, the
court refused to give the diversity requirements substantive meaning, describing them as "well-
qualified," leaving "a great deal of room for honest debate." Id. at 1027. Because the interpretation of
the diversity requirement involved "a high level of technical expertise" the court deferred to the
agency's expertise. Id. at 1028.
154. 823 F. Supp. 668,671 (D.S.D. 1993). Specifically, an August decision authorized the use of
any EPA-approved pesticide on prairie dogs, the consolidation of prairie dog colonies, and a one-mile
buffer zone between prairie dog colonies and adjacent private and Indian lands. Sharps, 823 F. Supp. at
671-72. An October decision memo established a specific number of colonies, necessitating consolida-
tion of some colonies, and implemented a one-mile buffer zone. Id. at 672. Sharps appealed only the
October decision memo, not the August one. Id. at 671.
155. Sharps, 823 F. Supp. at 678. In arguing for standing, Sharps asserted that the management
change would reduce or eliminate the northern swift fox, whose diet depends largely on black-tailed
prairie dogs. Id. at 673. Presumably, this was the basis of his diversity claim under NFMA.
156. Id. at 679.
157. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
158. Sharps, 823 F. Supp. at 679. "Planning areas are only those areas covered by a forest plan
or regional plan." 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
, 159. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19. It is not clear what a planning area is, though. The Forest Service
routinely designates timber sale project areas as "planning areas." for example. See. e.g.. Sierra Club.
v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 92-5101, slip op. at 1-2 (D.S.D. Oct. 28. 1993).
160. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19. This may very well occur with certain old-growth-dependent species,
such as the spotted owl or marbled murrelet, primarily because the old-growth forests have been almost
completely logged..
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The issue of whether the diversity requirement is intended to apply to
forest plans, not individual timber sales, is not so easily resolved, how-
ever.1"" This interpretation appears to be supported by legislative history:
Congress was concerned with maintaining the diversity of the national
forests so that they did not become "tree farms." 162 Congress was not
willing to dictate in detail how those forests should be managed, however. It
therefore vested a tremendous amount of discretion in the agency to
determine optimum management practices within the boundaries set by
NFMA. Further, the purpose of forest plans is to guide the Forest Service
in making project-level and forest-level decisions.
The Sharps interpretation that a district plan is not required to
provide for diversity appears to be supported by Wilkinson and Anderson,
who note that "the viable populations requirement apparently applies to
regional guides as well as to forest plans."' 63 Although Sharps was not
appealing the entire forest plan, the court could have analyzed the impact
that the challenged management decision would have had on diversity
throughout the forest. To refuse to apply the statute because the appealed
decision does not cover the entire forest means that only forest-plan appeals
can include diversity claims. Given that a forest plan is in force for 10-15
years, and that project-level decisions are made throughout that time, the
Sharps interpretation would severely restrict the usefulness of the diversity
requirement. Courts should be willing to examine the effect of a particular
project, such as a timber sale or a new management decision, by analyzing
the project's impact on diversity throughout the planning area. If the
reductions are acceptable, then the project complies with NFMA. If,
however, the actions taken in a particular project will result in a significant
reduction in diversity throughout the planning area, the court should then
analyze the multiple-use objectives being met by the project and make its
decision in accordance with both 36 C.F.R. section 219.19 and section
219.27(g).
iii) Consideration of Diversity Is Not Enough
Even if courts follow this in-depth analysis, they still must determine
what type of Forest Service action will satisfy the NFMA diversity
requirement. The Robertson 1I court noted, for example, that the Environ-
mental Assessment for the challenged timber sale concluded that "diver-
sity, on balance, will increase because certain animal species will benefit
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) addresses regulations to guide the development of "land management
plans." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1). The plans are to cover "units of the National Forest System." 16
U.S.C. § 1604(a).
162. See generally Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 171-73.
163. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 297 n.1587.
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from the timber clearing"'" and held that this "consideration" of diversity
fulfilled the agency's duty under NFMA. The court did not specifically find
whether certain species would decline as a result of the timber sales.'" 3
Mere consideration of diversity in no way fulfills the mandate of the
statute 6 ' or the regulations.167 As Judge Parker of the Eastern District of
Texas recently stated,"No amount of means-or words of "considera-
tion"-can take the place of the statutorily-compelled end-or ac-
tion-that the Service must perform." 6 8 This is what differentiates a
procedural statute such as NEPA from substantive provisions such as those
in NFMA. While NEPA requires that agencies make informed decisions,
it neither requires nor prohibits particular outcomes. 69 It demands, in the
words of the Robertson II court, that an agency "consider" the potential
impacts of its action. NFMA, however, requires much more than consider-
ation; it imposes an affirmative duty on the agency to take actions that will
"ensure" certain outcomes, such as diversity.
iv) Summary
Courts should interpret the diversity requirement of the statute and
the viability requirement of the regulations as imposing a substantive duty
on the Forest Service to protect wildlife.'70 This duty is not diminished
merely because a species is listed as threatened or endangered under the
Endangered Species Act.' 7' More importantly, it should be enforced as
articulated in the regulations: to ensure the continued existence of
vertebrate and non-vertebrate species throughout the area covered by a
forest plan. That application should occur whether the plaintiff has
appealed a forest plan, a timber sale or a wildlife-management decision.
Finally, this is a substantive duty. Although it includes procedural
components, it is not satisfied by mere "consideration."
164. Robertson II, 784 F. Supp. at 611.
165. Id.
166. "The regulations shall [specify] guidelines for land management plans... which...provide
for diversity of plant and animal communities...." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
167. "Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing
native and desired non-native vertebrate species .... [Hiabitat must be provided to support, at least, a
minimum number of reproductive individuals .... 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (emphasis added).
168. Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 364 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
169. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council. 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989).
170. See, e.g., SeattleAudubon Soc'yv. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484,1489 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
171. Seattle Audubon Soe'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (citations
omitted), aff'd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
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2. Post-Plan Changes: Monitoring, Assessment and Plan Amendment-
§ 1604(g)(3)(C)
NFMA states that the regulations shall require forest plans to provide
for continuous monitoring and assessment of the effects of management
practices to ensure that they "will not produce substantial and permanent
impairment of the productivity of the land."' 72 The regulations state that
forest plans shall contain "[m]onitoring and evaluation requirements that
will provide a basis for a periodic determination and evaluation of the
effects of management practices."' 73 They also list what types of activities
and effects the agency must monitor. 74
NFMA further provides that forest plans shall be revised "from time
to time when the Secretary finds that conditions in a unit have significantly
changed, but at least every fifteen years .... 1"7" The regulations state that
the "Forest Supervisor may amend the forest plan,' 17  and that the
supervisor "shall review the conditions on the land covered by the plan at
least every 5 years to determine whether conditions or demands of the
public have change [sic] significantly. 177
The monitoring and assessment section has not been invoked by
plaintiffs seeking judicial review in any reported decisions '8 although the
172. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C).
173. 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(d).
174. Specifically, the regulations require monitoring to include:
(1) A quantitative estimate of performance comparing outputs and services within those
projected by the forest plan;
(2) Documentation of the measured prescriptions and effects, including significant changes
in productivity of the land; and
(3) Documentation of costs associated with carrying out the planned management
prescriptions as compared with costs estimated in the forest plan.
(4) A description of the following monitoring activities:
(i) The actions, effects, or resources to be measured, and the frequency of measurements;
(ii) Expected precision and reliability of the monitoring process; and
(iii) The time when evaluation will be reported.
(5) A determination of compliance with the following standards:
(i) Land are adequately restocked as specified in the forest plan;
(ii) Lands identified as not suited for timber production are examined at least every 10 years
to determine if they have become suited; and that, if determined suited, such lands are
returned to timber production;
(iii) Maximum size limits for harvest areas are evaluated to determined whether such size
limits should be continued; and
(iv) Destructive insects and disease organisms do not increase to potentially damaging levels
following management activities.
36 C.F.R. § 219.13(k)(l)-(5).
175. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(")(5).
176. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(").
177. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g).
178. In an unreported decision, plaintiffs Sierra Club and Native Ecosystems Council
unsuccessfully argued that the Forest Service had failed to monitor management indicator species
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amendment section was used as the basis for a claim in Citizens for
Environmental Quality v. United States.19 Monitoring and amendment
are clearly related: monitoring may lead to recognition of "significant
changes" that have occurred as a result of management activities, thereby
triggering the duty to amend under section 1604(f)(5). In Citizens for
Environmental Quality, however, the court did not adequately distinguish
the two in its analysis. The plaintiffs claimed that forest plan implementa-
tion had caused "significant landslides and slope failures" and that the
Forest Service must therefore revise the plan to protect soils as required by
NFMA. 180 The court refused to make a finding as to whether the landslides
and slope failures had actually occurred or, if they had, whether they
required plan amendment, because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. 18'
Had the plaintiffs been able to prove that conditions had deteriorated
significantly, the court could have relied on the monitoring requirement as
well as the mandate to avoid irreversible damage to soils and the
amendment provision to order the Forest Service to either further study the
issue or amend the plan. Instead, the court simply reiterated that the duty
to amend is discretionary and that the regulations require the forest plan to
provide for continual monitoring. The Citizens for Environmental Quality
court declined to impose an affirmative duty on the Forest Service, stating,
"We must assume the good faith of the Forest Service in dealing with the
changes revealed as part of the monitoring process."'18 Like other
substantive sections of NFMA, however, the monitoring requirement can
and should be interpreted as imposing a duty on the Forest Service to
ensure that its chosen management alternative does not cause unintended
"substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the
land."118 This language reflects the concern expressed by Congress that
increasing the amount of timber cut from national forest lands without
regard for whether the land is capable of regeneration within a reasonable
amount of time may eventually deplete the timber resource and adversely
(MIS). Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 92-5101, slip op. at 45-46 (D.S.D. Oct. 28.1993). The
court concluded from the administrative record that adequate monitoring had occurred, although it did
so with no further explanation of underlying facts. Id. at 46.
179. 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989).
180. Citizens for Envtil. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 992.
181. Id. "Plaintiff may not circumvent established agency procedures and remedies by asking us
to conduct a de novo hearing as to this issue." Id. See also infra notes 483-511 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the exhaustion doctrine.
182. Id. at 992. The court was unwilling to review this issue because plaintiffs were raising it for
the first time and had not afforded the agency an opportunity to respond. Id. Therefore, its comments
are dicta and do not necessarily reflect judicial deference to the agency's actions as much as to the
agency's right to establish a factual record and have the initial opportunity to respond to appeals.
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C).
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affect non-timber resources."" Amending the plan may be discretionary,
but monitoring the effects of management activities is not.
3. Suitability Guidelines - § 1604(k) and § 1604(g)(3)(E)
a) Economic Suitability and Below-Cost Timber Management
NFMA imposes two sets of suitability guidelines on the Forest
Service: physical suitability 185 and economic suitability.18 Section
1604(k) requires the Forest Service to "identify lands within the manage-
ment area which are not suited for timber production, considering
physical, economic, and other pertinent factors.., and.., assure that... no
timber harvesting shall occur on such lands for a period of 10 years."' 18
Plaintiffs have argued unsuccessfully that this section requires the Forest
Service to manage the national forests on a cost-efficient basis. 88 The
legislative history of section 1604(k) is ambiguous as to congressional
intent. 89 Although uneconomical timber management was a concern of
both the Bolle Report and the Church Subcommittee, 9 ' the Forest
Service's ability to cut timber for nonmonetary objectives such as wildlife
184. The Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee report states:
The rapid, widespread cutting of currently mature trees may well be an advisable practice
on privately-held lands where the basic management objective is maximizing short-term
economic returns. The Committee believes, however, that such practices are incompatible
with the management of the National Forests, where decisions must be based on the
numerous public values of the forest, in addition to economic returns.
S. REP. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6662, 6686.
185. See 16 U.S.C. § 604(g)(3)(E).
186. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(k).
187. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(k). The statute further states that the Secretary of Agriculture "shall
review his decision to classify these lands as not suited for timber production at least every 10 years and
shall return these lands to timber production whenever he determines that conditions have changed so
that they have become suitable for timber production." Id.
188. See Citizensfor Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 988-89. Plaintiffs in Resources Ltd., Inc. v.
Robertson challenged a forest plan EIS for not considering a cost-efficient alternative and claimed that
the Forest Service must take into consideration economic efficiency in selecting lands for timber
harvesting. 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1537-39 (D. Mont. 1991), afd in part, rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th
Cir. 1993). Like the court in Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 686 F. Supp. 256 (D.
Mont. 1988) (below-cost timber sales challenged), the Resources Ltd. court relied on Thomas v.
Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that national forests do not have to be
managed on an economically efficient basis. Resources Ltd., 789 F. Supp. at 1538; Big Hole Ranchers,
686 F. Supp. at 263. Thomas was based on 16 U.S.C. § 1608, a section in NFMA that specifically
addresses road construction. Big Hole and Resources Ltd. both indicate that Thomas will be
interpreted broadly, and will apply even when plaintiffs rely on different sections of NFMA.
A further difficulty for plaintiffs challenging below-cost timber sales has been their inability to
obtain standing. See, e.g., Big Hole Ranchers, 686 F. Supp. at 263 (holding that plaintiff failed to allege
any harm from below-cost sales); Churchwell v. Robertson, 748 F. Supp. 768, 776 (D. Idaho 1990)
(holding that taxpayer plaintiffs did not allege sufficient "personal stake in the outcome").
189. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 162-70.
190. Id. at 162.
NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT
habitat improvement offset any possibility of an outright ban on below-cost
timber production.191 As a result, the Committee of Scientists concluded
that section 1604(k) does not mandate any clear direction for economical
management. 92
The ambiguity of the legislative history, the difficulty for plaintiffs in
achieving standing and the precedent set by Thomas v. Peterson9 3 have
rendered section 1604(k) ineffective as a tool to prevent timber sales that
generate less revenue than they cost. As long as Congress is willing to
endorse uneconomical forest management, the courts will probably not
step in to interfere.
b) Physical Suitability
Section 1604(g)(3)(E) specifies that timber harvesting may take
place only where the Forest Service can insure that certain resources will be
protected.9 The physical suitability guidelines have been called "some of
the strongest medicine that Congress prescribed in NFMA."' 9 5 The first
two provisions, covering soils and regeneration, were adopted directly from
the Church Guidelines. 96 However, while the Church Guidelines applied
only to clearcutting, the NFMA guidelines apply to all timber harvest-
ing.197 In addition, NFMA guidelines regarding water quality protection
restrict timber harvesting more stringently than the Church Guidelines.9
The physical suitability analysis process is divided into three stages, as
set forth in the regulations.99 In the first stage, lands are to be identified as
191. Id. at 162-64.
192. Id. at 168 (citing Final Report of the Committee of Scientists. 44 Fed. Reg. 26.599.26,607
(1979)).
193. See supra note 188; see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3. at 168-69.
194. The regulations shall include, but not be limited to. .. specifying guidelines for land
management plans ... which... insure that timber will be harvested from National Forest
System lands only where-
(i) soil, slope or other watershed conditions will not be irreversibly damaged;
(ii) there is assurance that such lands can be adequately restocked within five years after
harvest;
(iii) protection is provided for streams, streambanks, shorelines, lakes, wetlands, and other
bodies of water from detrimental changes in water temperatures, blockages of water
courses, and deposits of sediment, where harvests are likely to seriously and adversely affect
water conditions or fish habitat; and
(iv) the harvesting system to be used is not selected primarily because it will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output of timber.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i)-(iv).
195. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 159.
196. Id. at 160; see also supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
197. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 160.
198. Id.
199. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14.
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not suited for timber production if (1) they are not forest land,200 (2)
technology is not available to ensure timber production without irreversi-
ble damage to soil productivity or watershed conditions,20' (3) there is no
reasonable assurance that the lands can be "adequately restocked, ' 202 or
(4) the land has been withdrawn from timber production. 203 Land that is
suitable under stage one is then evaluated under the economic analyses of
stages two and three.20 4 In stage two, the agency is to analyze the costs and
benefits of a range of timber management intensities. 5 Stage three
provides that lands which are not "cost-efficient" are not suitable for
timber production, evaluating both timber and non-timber uses.206 The
regulations allow timber harvesting on unsuitable lands in the case of
salvage sales, sales necessary to protect multiple-use values or "activities
that meet other objectives on such lands if the forest plan establishes that
such actions are appropriate."210
i) Soil, Slope & Watershed Limitations
The statute requires that timber be harvested only where soil, slope or
other watershed conditions will not be irreversibly damaged. 20 8 As men-
tioned above, the regulations include this limitation as part of a three-stage
suitability analysis.209 Specifically, the regulations state that lands are not
suited for timber production if "[t]echnology is not available to ensure
timber production from the land without irreversible resource damage to
soils productivity, or watershed conditions. 2
10
In Citizens for Environmental Quality, plaintiffs challenged the
200. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(1). The regulations define forest land as land that is at least 10
percent covered with trees of any size, or land that used to have trees on it and is not currently developed
for non-forest use, such as agriculture, residential use, or roads. 36 C.F.R. § 219.3.
201. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(2).
202. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(3). Adequate restocking is defined as:
When trees are cut to achieve timber production objectives, the cuttings shall be made in
such a way as to assure that the technology and knowledge exists [sic] to adequately restock
the lands within 5 years after final harvest. Research and experience shall be the basis for
determining whether the harvest and regeneration practices planned can be expected to
result in adequate restocking. Adequate restocking means that the cut area will contain the
minimum number, size, distribution, and species composition of regeneration as specified in
regional silvicultural guides for each forest type.
36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(3).
203. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(4).
204. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(b)-(c); see also Sierra Clubv. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095, 1099-1100
(D. Colo. 1990).
205. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(b); Cargill, 732 F. Supp. at 1100.
206. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(c)(3); Cargill, 732 F. Supp. at 1100.
207. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(1).
208. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i).
209. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)-(d).
210. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(2).
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implementing regulation and the Forest Service's interpretation and
application of it in the Rio Grande National Forest Plan."' The Forest
Service relied on the regulations to conclude that forest land was suitable
for timber production if the technology existed to harvest timber without
irreversibly harming soil and water. 2 The technology did not have to be
available in the local area, nor did it have to be cost-efficient to use it.213
The court upheld the regulation, finding that it conforms to the
statutory intent, which is to provide adequate guidelines for insuring
against irreversible damage.1 4 It further held that the Forest Service may
identify unsuitable lands on a project-by-project basis, rather than in the
forest plan, if the agency lacks sufficient inventory data at the time it makes
its suitability analysis.215 It did not uphold the Forest Service's guidelines
regarding the availability of technology, however. If lands would be
unsuitable except for available technology, the agency must specifically
identify the technology and provide for its use.2 6 The court ordered the
agency to identify any technology upon which it relied for the suitability
exception, and to outline provisions for implementation of the technol-
ogy.217 The court therefore found a middle ground in interpreting NFMA
and its regulations. It rejected plaintiffs' interpretation-that the agency
must never damage soil or water resources in timber harvesting-but it
similarly -rejected defendants' interpretation-that technology must sim-
ply be available. The court properly sought to determine and enforce the
underlying intent of the statute.
ii) Five-Year Restocking
NFMA requires the Forest Service to promulgate regulations to
ensure that timber will be harvested only from national forest lands where
"there is assurance that such lands can be adequately restocked within five
211. 731 F. Supp. 970, 983 (D. Colo. 1989) (challenging 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(2)).
212. Id. at 984.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. The court clearly stated, however, that "provisions must be made for the completion of
the necessary data base before projects are implemented." Id.
216. Id. at 985. The court interpreted 36 C.F.R. § 219.14 as following:
If there exists technology which is capable of adequately repairing short-term damage due
to timber harvesting within a reasonable time, and provisions are made for the use of that
technology, then timber production may be carried out despite whatever short-term damage
may be caused. However, where timber harvesting is contemplated on potentially
unsuitable lands, then the technology to be used in preventing irreversible damage must be
identified and provisions made for its implementation.
Id.
217. Citizens for Envil. Quality. 731 F. Supp. at 986.
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years after harvest."2 18 In outlining the timber suitability analysis which
the Forest Service must perform during the planning process, the NFMA
regulations state that lands are not suitable for timber harvesting unless
there is "reasonable assurance" that lands can be adequately restocked.219
The meaning of "adequately restocked" is amplified in a separate
regulation,220 which also states that timber shall be harvested in such a way
"to assure that the technology and knowledge exists [sic] to adequately
restock the lands within 5 years after final harvest. 221 The duty of the
Forest Service under this standard was litigated in two relatively early
NFMA cases.222 The agency must create a "realistic" restocking plan
which identifies the technology to be used and provides for its
implementation.223
The plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Cargill asked the court to order the
Forest Service to amend the Bighorn National Forest Plan and enjoin the
agency from harvesting timber except in those areas where it could assure
adequate restocking within five years.22 The Forest Service used a seven-
year restocking standard in its timber suitability analysis, not a five-year
standard.225 In its final administrative decision, the agency found that the
seven-year standard complied with the statute and the regulations .12
The court held that the seven-year standard violated NFMA 21 7 and
ordered the agency to amend the forest plan.228 In delineating the
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii).
219. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(3).
220. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(c)(3).
221. Id.
222. Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 686 F. Supp. 256 (D. Mont. 1988); Sierra
Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1545 ( 10th Cir.
1993).
223. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. at 1100.
224. Id. at 1096-97.
225. Id. at 1098.
226. Id. A year later, the Forest Service Chief ordered the regional forester to amend the plan to
assure adequate restocking within five years. Id. The court held that this did not moot the lawsuit, as the
agency had not amended the plan and still considered the seven-year standard to be legal. Id.
227. Id. at 1099.
228. Id. at 1101. The Forest Service did not appeal this decision. It amended the forest plan to
include a five-year restocking standard, but did so without going through the three-stage suitability
analysis. Based on an Environmental Assessment, the agency found the change from a seven-year
standard to a five-year standard was not significant, and therefore did not require a full suitability
analysis under 36 C.F.R. § 219. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(0. The district court refused to dissolve the
injunction, however, and ordered the agency to do a three-stage analysis. Sierra Club. v. Cargill, II
F.3d 1545, 1546-50 (10th Cir. 1993).
The Forest Service appealed that decision, and the Tenth Circuit held for the Forest Service,
finding that the lower court had abused its discretion. Id. at 1550. "Applying the proper deferential
standard, this Court cannot say, nor could the district court appropriately say, that the Forest Service
acted arbitrarily or capriciously or abused its discretion in treating the move from a seven-year to a five-
year regeneration standard as a 'non-significant' change." Id. at 1548-49. The dissent argued that the
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parameters of the duty imposed on the Forest Service by NFMA and its
regulations, the court sought to maintain the "integrity" of the statute-2 ,
The court refused to interpret the statute and regulations as requiring only
that restocking be hypothetically possible, without requiring the agency to
specify the technology and its implementation in the planning area.2 30
Again, this interpretation enforces the underlying intent of NFMA by
requiring more than a promise from the Forest Service, while still deferring
to the agency's expertise to actually manage the forests.
In the only other restocking case, Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S.
Forest Service, the court deferred to the Forest Service without analyzing
NFMA or its implementing regulations.2 1 The plaintiffs claimed that the
Forest Service had not assured that the challenged sale areas would
232 corregenerate within five years. The court found that the agency had made
the necessary assurances. 23 3 The issue in Big Hole Ranchers was a factual
one: whether regeneration in the proposed timber sale areas was possible
within five years. The Forest Service contended that it was but the plaintiffs
disagreed, relying on their own expert.24 The court was not persuaded by
plaintiffs' expert, however, and found that the Forest Service's determina-
tion was not arbitrary, was well-reasoned and was "based on considerable
agency expertise and experience."235 The agency is responsible for devel-
oping the factual record, and is considered to have the expertise necessary
to make a determination on the issue. It is proper for courts to decide
whether such factual findings are arbitrary or capricious, however, for in
that case the agency has abdicated its responsibility as a steward of the
land.2"6
iii) Water conditions and fish habitat
NFMA requires the Forest Service to promulgate regulations which
agency had not appealed the injunction, and the district court was simply enforcing the terms of its
injunction. Id. at 1550 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
This decision does not affect the substantive determination made by the lower court regarding the
restocking standard.
229. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. at 1101.
230. Id.
231. Big Hole Ranchers, 686 F. Supp. at 263-64.
232. Id. at 264.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Such a determination may necessitate going beyond the agency record to decide whether a
factual issue, which seems reasonable on its face, is based upon scientific findings that are arbitrary and
capricious. Some courts are extremely reluctant to do this. See infra notes 511-35 and accompanying
text. In Big Hole Ranchers, however, Judge Hatfield conducted a three-day trial before making his
ruling.
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ensure that timber will be harvested only where waterways are pro-
tected.237 In Sierra Club v. Robertson (Robertson III),238 plaintiffs argued
that the agency had failed to meet this obligation because it had not
promulgated any implementing regulations. 2" The court directed plain-
tiffs' attention to 36 C.F.R. section 219.27(e), which states that "[n]o
management practices causing detrimental changes in water temperature
or chemical composition, blockages of water courses, or deposits of
sediment shall be permitted within these areas which seriously and
adversely affect water conditions or fish habitat."'240 While this regulation
does limit the effects of management activities on water and fish habitat, it
is not included in the physical suitability analysis section of the regulations,
which implements section 1604(g)(3)(E). 24 Section 219.27(e) requires
the agency to protect water, but does not completely exclude from timber
harvesting land on which waterways cannot be adequately protected.
Although the court's opinion does not lay out plaintiffs' argument, it
appears to be this: that water protection should be a basis for declaring land
unsuitable for harvesting. The court did not interpret plaintiffs' argument
in this manner, although such an interpretation may have merit.
In one of the few other claims raised under this section, plaintiffs
claimed that the Forest Service had defined wetlands incorrectly, thereby
violating NFMA and its implementing regulations.242 The court refused to
address the NFMA claims, however, because the agency had made a
factual determination that no wetlands or floodplains existed in the
relevant area and plaintiffs had not adduced any contrary evidence. 243 The
court's brief discussion makes it difficult to fully understand this issue, but
because the plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service had defined wetlands
improperly, the fact that the Forest Service had concluded there were no
wetlands in the timber-sale area was irrelevant. Plaintiffs' claim may have
been that the incorrect definition was the basis for the Forest Service's
finding, and that the finding was therefore erroneous. If so, it was
unreasonable for the court to justify its decision on the agency's finding.24'
237. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii). The statute states that regulations shall allow timber
harvesting "only where... protection is provided for streams, streambanks, shorelines, lakes, wetlands,
and other bodies of water from detrimental changes in water temperatures, blockages of water courses,
and deposits of sediment, where harvests are likely to seriously and adversely affect water conditions or
fish habitat." Id.
238. 810 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
239. Robertson II1, 810 F. Supp. at 1025-26.
240. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219(27)(e)).
241. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14.
242. Robertson 11, 784 F. Supp. at 609.
243. Id.
244. The court did not indicate it was deferring to the agency's factual findings. It may have bccn
that the plaintiffs failed to adequately brief the issue.
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The Arkansas court should not have immddiately deferred to the agency's
factual finding. When the agency has interpreted the law arbitrarily or
capriciously, any factual determination made on the basis of that interpre-
tation should be scrutinized.
In another claim raised under this section, plaintiffs challenging the
Flathead National Forest Plan and accompanying EIS in Resources
Limited, Inc. v. Robertson contended that the Forest Service did not
adequately analyze the impacts of increased sediment from timber
harvesting on water quality and fisheries. 2 5 The Forest Service agreed that
it had not made site-specific analyses, but that it would do so at the project
level.246 In addition, the plan stated that every timber sale must meet or
exceed state water quality standards. 24 7 The district court held for the
Forest Service, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.24 8
The district court analyzed the claim under NEPA rather than
NFMA,2 49 relying on a decision which held that site-specific analyses are
not required in a programmatic EIS.250 The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
distinguishing the water-quality case cited by plaintiffs251 by noting that it
concerned a site-specific plan, whereas Resources Limited involved a
forest-wide plan.2 52 "We are convinced that such specific analysis is better
done when a specific development action is to be taken, not at the
programmatic level," the court wrote.253 The case cited by the Ninth
Circuit,254 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,5
rested on NEPA and the Clean Water Act and did not address possible
effects on fish habitat. While Northwest Cemetery may be relevant to
plaintiffs' water quality claims, it does not fully address their NFMA
claim.
245. 789 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Mont. 1991), offd inpart. revdin part, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
246. Resources Ltd., 789 F. Supp. at 1536.
247. Id.
248. Id.; Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1401. The district court also held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and the issues were not ripe for review, 789 F. Supp. at 1534, but the Ninth Circuit reversed
that holding. 8 F.3d at 1398. See also infra notes 389-482 and accompanying text for a more thorough
discussion of standing and ripeness.
249. 789 F. Supp. at 1534-40. NEPA claims are inextricably entwined with NFMA claims in
forest-plan and timber-sale appeals. Every forest plan has an accompanying EIS. and plaintiffs usually
appeal both the plan and the EIS. See infra Section II(B)(2). Because NEPA case law is more
extensive than NFMA case law, plaintiffs may make a claim under NFMA but find that the court
decides it under NEPA, as happened in Resources Ltd.
250. 789 F. Supp. at 1536 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel. 819 F.2d 927,
930 (9th Cir. 1987)).
251. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
252. 8 F.3d at 1401.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Resources Limited provided the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to
analyze and articulate the standard necessary to prove that timber
harvesting is "likely to seriously and adversely affect water conditions or
fish habitat."256 Unfortunately, the court sidestepped the issue. It is
difficult to predict how section 1604(g) (3) (E) (iii) may be used by plaintiffs
in future challenges to forest plans or timber sales. If the Forest Service
specifies in a forest plan that all projects must meet or exceed state water
quality standards, as in Resources Limited, the court will probably find
that the agency has met its statutory duty under both NEPA and NFMA.
Plaintiffs may still challenge site-specific projects, however.
Still to be decided by courts are such questions as: If timber harvesting
will increase sediment enough to decrease the number of fish in a
waterway, is that a "serious" impact? Should adverse impacts be allowed
within the Forest Service discretion? Neither the statute nor the legislative
history provide much guidance. For example, the Senate Committee
Report states:
The Committee believes that the Forest Service should make
greater use of the expertise of State fish and wildlife agencies, the
Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries
Service. Activities that may affect significant fish and wildlife
habitat must be very carefully planned and monitored to assure
that habitat values are recognized and properly protected. 117
Obviously, preserving water quality and fish habitat was an important
goal of those who drafted and passed NFMA. Section 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii)
should not be taken lightly; instead, it should be interpreted as a
substantive limitation on Forest Service timber harvesting. The duty is
imposed on the Forest Service, although the drafters envisioned a coopera-
tive approach among various agencies. The duty is not absolute, but should
not be interpreted as a rigid, isolated restriction. NFMA is a multiple-use
statute, after all. Preserving the integrity of this substantive requirement
may further limit the use of particular harvest techniques, or timber sales
in particular areas, but would conform with the intent of the NFMA and its
drafters.
4. Even-Aged Management §- 1604(g)(3)(F)
a) The Statute and Regulations
NFMA requires the Forest Service to promulgate regulations which
256. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii).
257. S. REP. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6662,
6698.
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will insure that even-aged management be used in national forests only
when certain conditions are met.258 For all methods of even-aged manage-
ment, the agency must insure that "such cuts are carried out in a manner
consistent with the protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation,
and esthetic resources, and the regeneration of the timber resource." 259
The implementing regulations provide a detailed definition of even-
aged management. 68 They further provide that all management prescrip-
tions involving "vegetative manipulation of tree cover" shall be "best
suited to the multiple-use goals established for the area," with a variety of
considerations to be stated in the regional guides and forest plans.261
Clearcutting, the most common and controversial method of even-
aged management, was a primary focus of Congress at the time NFMA
was enacted.2 62 Specifically, NFMA provides that for clearcutting to be
used, it must be "determined to be the optimum method ... ,,263 The
regulations go so far as to prescribe size limitations on clearcuts, 26'
allowing exceptions "where larger units will produce a more desirable
combination of net public benefits. 26 5
Some of the strongest language in the statute is that which requires
258. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i)-(v). The statute states that clearcutting, seed-tree cutting
and shelterwood cuts are examples of even-aged management, but suggests that the test for whether a
particular harvest technique is even-aged management is whether the goal of the harvest method is to
regenerate an even-aged stand of trees. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F).
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v).
260. The regulation describes even-aged management as:
[t]he application of a combination of actions that results in the creation of stands in which
trees of essentially the same age grow together. Managed even-aged forests are character-
ized by a distribution of stands of varying ages (and, therefore, tree sizes) throughout the
forest area. The difference in age between trees forming the main canopy level of a stand
usually does not exceed 20 percent of the age of the stand at harvest rotation age.
Regeneration in a particular stand is obtained during a short period at or near the time that a
stand has reached the desired age or size for regeneration and is harvested. Clearcut,
shelterwood, or seed-tree cutting produce even-aged stands.
36 C.F.R. § 219.3.
261. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(b)(1), For example, environmental, biological, cultural resource,
aesthetic, engineering, and economic impacts are to be considered. Id.
262. See supra notes 50-80 and accompanying text discussing the controversy over clearcutting
in the early 1970s; see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 69 (Congress' long history of
deference to Forest Service shifted after the "clearcutting controversy" in Monongahela; the time was
ripe to place substantive controls on the agency).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
264. The regulation states:
Individual cut blocks, patches or strips ... may be less than, but will not exceed, 60 acres for
the Douglas-fir forest type of California, Oregon, and Washington; 80 acres for the southern
yellow pine types of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi. North
Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas; 100 acres for the hemlock-sitka spruce
forest type of coastal Alaska; and 40 acres for all other forest types ....
36 C.F.R. § 219.27(d)(2).
265. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(d)(2)(i).
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clearcutting to be the "optimum method."2 ' The Church guidelines,
which placed substantive limitations on timber harvest practices prior to
the passage of NFMA,267 allowed clearcutting only if the agency deter-
mined it was "silviculturally essential."26 The Senate Committee report
from the NFMA hearings states that" 'optimum method' means it must
be the most favorable or conducive to reaching the specified goals of the
management plan... [and] is, therefore, a broader concept than 'silvicul-
turally essential' or 'desirable'-terms considered and rejected by the
Committee." 69 That language indicates that Congress did not intend to
prohibit clearcutting or even require it to be the scientifically best harvest
method. It was intended that clearcutting could be used to create wildlife
habitat or promote recreation. 270 Congress did not intend, however, to
allow clearcutting simply because it produces the highest rate of return. In
section 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv), NFMA places yet another restriction on
timber management by requiring that "the harvesting system to be used is
not selected primarily because it will give the greatest dollar return or the
greatest unit output of timber."' 271 There is a balance to be struck, then,
between economic considerations and resource considerations. Nonethe-
less, when taken as a whole, section 1604(g) suggests that even-aged
management should be used with great care, in rare circumstances.
b) Economic Feasibility Studies
NFMA also states that even-aged management is to be used only
where the "potential environmental, biological, esthetic, engineering, and
economic impacts on each advertised sale area have been assessed. 272 In
Citizens for Environmental Quality, the plaintiffs claimed that this section
required the Forest Service to conduct an economic feasibility study on
each timber sale it offered.273 The court disagreed, holding that the agency
had met its duty under the statute by promulgating an implementing
regulation.274 It held that the statute and regulation did not mandate an
266. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
267. See supra Section I for a full discussion of the passage of NFMA; see also Wilkinson &
Anderson, supra note 3.
268. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 187 (citing CHURCH SUBCOMMItTEE REPORT,
supra note 58).
269. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 187 n.965 (citing S. REP. No. 893,94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6662, 6698, and in SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE,
NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., COMPILATION OF THE FOREST AND RANGELAND
RENEWABLE RESOURCES ACT OF 1974, at 319 (Comm. Print 1979)).
270. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 3, at 187-88.
271. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv).
272. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(ii).
273. 731 F. Supp. 970, 991 (D. Colo. 1989).
274. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(a)(7): "Resource protection. All management prescrip-
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economic feasibility study in the forest plan, but "any time prior to the
implementation of the project. ' 275 Here, the court holds that NFMA does
not mandate an analysis at the project stage, but only at the plan stage. In
general, this appears to be true: NFMA establishes guidelines for forest
planning, with the caveat that all projects-"[r]esource plans, permits,
contracts and other instruments for the use and occupancy of National
Forest system lands"-must conform with the controlling forest plan.2 "
c) Judicial Review: "Optimum Method"
Only one court has reviewed Forest Service actions in light of the
"optimum method" language. 7 In Resources Limited, Inc. v. Robertson,
plaintiffs alleged that the forest plan violated NFMA because the agency
failed to demonstrate that clearcutting was the optimum harvest method
for any proposed sales in the plan.27 8 The court interpreted NFMA as
requiring "the Forest Service[, when it] is about to authorize a sale,.., to
determine whether clearcutting is the optimum method to meet the
objectives and requirements of the relevant land management plan." 279 In
other words, according to the district court, the "optimum method"
determination is a post-plan decision. 280 The statute, however, applies
specifically to forest plans and clearly requires the Forest Service to
promulgate regulations to insure that clearcutting is used only where it is
determined to be the optimum method.281
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not directly address the optimum-
method issue. It did, however, affirm the district court's holding that the
Forest Service had considered an adequate range of alternatives in the
plan, even though no alternative allocated less than 75 percent of the
tions shall... [b]e assessed prior to project implementation for potential physical, biological, aesthetic,
cultural, engineering, and economic impacts and for consistency with multiple uses planned for the
general area ....").
275. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 991.
276. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).
277. This is surprising, given that clearcutting was the impetus for the Bolle Report, the
Monongahela decision and, ultimately, NFMA. It is the authors' belief and experience that this is a
major issue in administrative appeals of timber sales; however, only a very small percentage of those
appeals are further appealed to the courts. For example, the Forest Service decided 1.182 appeals in
fiscal year 1991. F. Dale Robertson, Chief, U.S. Forest Service, before theSubcomm. on Public Lands,
National Parks and Forests, Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, The Effect of Forest
Service Plan and TimberAppeals on TimberSupply 5 (Nov. 21, 199 1) (unpublished copy on file with
the author). Approximately half of those involve timber sales. Id. In contrast, fewer than 50 NFMA
cases have been heard by the courts over the past decade.
278. Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1536 (D. Mont. 1991). rev'd inpart.
aff'd in part, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
279. Id. at 1537.
280. Id.
281. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
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harvest to even-aged management.2 82 Plaintiffs argued that the Forest
Service chose its range of alternatives as a result of economic factors rather
than silvicultural factors. The Ninth Circuit reiterated section
1604(g)(3)(E)(iv) and held that the Forest Service may include economic
factors in its planning as long as "the harvesting system to be used is not
selected primarily because it will give the greatest dollar return or the
greatest unit output for timber."2 3 It went on to state that the plaintiffs
would be able to challenge site-specific EISs or EAs "if clearcutting is
improperly endorsed as the optimum harvest method."2 4 This holding
suggests the Ninth Circuit is affirming the district court's holding, but in
dicta. The court did not analyze the optimum-method issue and failed to
enforce the underlying intent of the statute by allowing such a high
percentage of timber to be in even-aged management, further muddying
the "optimum method" waters.
d) Judicial Review: Duty to Protect Other Resources
Not all courts have been so reluctant to look at the underlying
statutory intent. In addition to requiring clearcuts to be the "optimum
method," NFMA requires all even-aged cuts to be "carried out in a
manner consistent with the protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife,
recreation, and esthetic resources, and the regeneration of the timber
resource." 85 This requirement formed the basis of a challenge to a forest
plan, EIS and several proposed timber sales in Texas.2 86 In issuing a
preliminary injunction to halt several timber sales, the district court stated:
It appears quite likely that Plaintiffs will succeed in demonstrat-
ing that Defendants have failed to fulfill the latter's substantive
NFMA obligations. Defendants have taken the extreme, and
untenable, position that there is no provision of the APA or the
NFMA allowing the plaintiffs to judicially challenge actual, on-
the-ground practices of the Forest Service.2 87
282. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1402.
283. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv)).
284. Id.
285. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v).
286. Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993). At least four decisions address
plaintiffs' challenges to the forest plan and EIS for the Texas National Forests. In the first decision, the
court refused to waive the administrative exhaustion requirement for plaintiffs. Sierra Club v. Lyng,
694 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (E.D. Tex. 1988). The next two decisions address plaintiffs' Endangered
Species Act claims. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, and remanded sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
In the most recent decision, the court ruled on the likelihood of plaintiffs' success on their NFMA
and NEPA claims concerning the Forest Service's even-aged management plans. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at
358.
287. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 363.
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The Forest Service argued that NFMA was a "mere 'planning statute,' i.e.,
with no substantive component."288 The court disagreed. 289 Relying on the
section requiring the protection of other resources when even-aged cuts are
used, the court stated that NFMA "contemplates that even-aged manage-
ment techniques will be used only in exceptional circumstances. '29 0 It
found, however, that the Forest Service used even-aged management "as if
it comprised the statutory 'rule,' rather than the exception."29 '
The court interpreted this section of NFMA as unambiguous,
requiring even-aged management to be used only when it is "consistent
with the protection of the forests' natural resources," which the court
specified "requires protection of the entire biological community-not of
one species. 29 2 It also drew an important distinction between the imposi-
tion of an affirmative duty to act, which is created by a substantive statute,
and the requirement that an agency simply "consider" some factor in its
decision, which is created by a procedural statute. 29" The court stated that
NFMA clearly placed substantive limitations on Forest Service logging
practices .294
This decision is similar to those in Seattle Audubon Society v.
Moseley295 and Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans 9 ' in the court's refusal
to "rubber stamp" agency action. Rather than narrowly focus on the
language of one section of NFMA, the court looked at the statute as a
whole to find that the Forest Service was not obeying the law. The court's
language regarding the "protection of the entire biological community"
appears to be drawing on the diversity requirements of NFMA as well as
the even-aged restrictions. In other words, the Espy court construed
NFMA as a whole to derive the Forest Service's duties. It did not construe
each section of NFMA in isolation. This contextual analysis is arguably
the best way to enforce congressional purpose and, therefore, statutory
intent.297
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 363-64.
291. Id. at 364. According to the forest plan, 82 percent of the Texas forest was to be under even-
aged management. Id. Of the nine scheduled timber sales being challenged, comprising more than
6,000 acres, less than 10 percent were to be cut using unevcn-aged management methods. Id.
292. Id.; accord Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Wash.
1992); see also supra notes 109-71 and accompanying text.
293. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 364.
294. Id.
295. 798 F. Supp. at 1488-90.
296. 952 F.2d 297, 299-302 (9th Cir. 1991).
297. See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUMBIA L.R. 452, 458 n.28 (1989).
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e) Summary
As has been shown throughout this article, a court's level of deference
to the agency's interpretation of its controlling statute plays a crucial role
in substantive interpretation. Judicial interpretation of the NFMA restric-
tions on clearcutting, for example, is completely different in Resources
Limited than in Espy. Both involved challenges to even-aged management
plans for an entire forest. But while one court accepted the agency's
interpretation, the other did not.
The difference may lie in the court's approach to judicial review. The
judiciary's role in reviewing a statute is to ensure that the agency charged
with implementing the statute is following the law. Too many courts
misinterpret Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council as requiring
the court to defer to the agency interpretation as long as it is reasonable.20 8
That conclusion should come as the result of the second step of Chevron;
the first step is to determine whether the statute itself is ambiguous or silent
as to the issue at hand.29 9 The first step is wholly a judicial responsibility.300
While ambiguity exists in almost every statute, the process of analyzing the
statute and searching for underlying intent is a valuable one, not only for
the litigants but for all those who rely on case law to clarify statutory duties.
In NFMA cases, as in all administrative law cases, courts would do well to
heed the Chevron mandate and attempt to discern statutory intent prior to
deferring to an agency's interpretation of the law. Failing to do so results in
administrative law-making, which is not per se undesirable, but which in
excess can and will disrupt the balance of power.301
5. Identifying Suitable/Unsuitable Lands and Timber Sales -§ 1604(l)(2)
NFMA states that "[p] lans developed in accordance with this section
shall ... be embodied in appropriate written material, including maps and
other descriptive documents, reflecting proposed and possible actions,
including the planned timber sale program and the proportion of probable
methods of timber harvest within the unit necessary to fulfill the plan." 30
Using this provision, plaintiffs have argued that the Forest Service must
clearly identify suitable lands on a map rather than simply describe them.
298. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron is the leading Supreme Court case on statutory interpretation. For a more complete discussion
of Chevron, see infra notes 543-45 and accompanying text.
299. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
300. See Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An
Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 (1988).
301. See generally Farina, supra note 297.
302. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(2).
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For example, in Sierra Club v. Robertson (Robertson 111),o. the plaintiffs
contended that the forest plan should have more specifically identified
lands that were unsuitable for timber production.3 0 ' However, the court
held that "NFMA does not require acre-by-acre specificity." 05 Further-
more, the court stated, "the agency's decision not to draw a map and make
a site-by-site analysis of unsuitability is not arbitrary; rather, it is a
reasonable interpretation of a statute within the agency's special expertise
that the court will not disturb."3 °6 The court first interpreted the statute as
not requiring a certain level of specificity and then found that the agency
interpretation was reasonable. Under Chevron, the court did not have to
make a finding as to reasonableness of the agency's interpretation because
it had already found the statute itself to be unambiguous.
In fact, the statute does appear to be ambiguous about the level of
specificity required. For example, the "planned timber sale program"30 8
implies that someone should be able to look up a proposed timber sale in a
forest plan and find enough description to be able to identify exactly where
the sale would be.309 But the statute is not as ambiguous regarding what
"appropriate written materials" are, in that they include "maps and other
descriptive documents."310 The court could have further analyzed the
specificity requirements without disturbing the agency's finding as to the
adequacy of written descriptions rather than maps.
Similarly, the plaintiffs in Resources Limited claimed that the plan
violated NFMA because the timber sale program area was not identified in
a map.311 The court listed the descriptive materials in the plan, and
concluded that the public had sufficient notice of where timber sales may be
conducted.31 2 The court did not appear to think very highly of plaintiffs'
argument,31 3 and in fact, the statute unambiguously allows written
descriptions to suffice.
303. Robertson III, 810 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
304. Id. at 1027.
305. Id.
306. Id. The statute requires plans to "be embodied in appropriate written material, including
maps and other descriptive documents." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(0(2).
307. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
308. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(0(2).
309. Some forest plans are this specific, and include a ten-year proposed timber-sale program
with sale described by location and harvest volume. See. e.g.. Appendix E. U.S. FOREST SERVIcE. LOLO
NAT'L FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEIENT PLAN (1986) [hereinafter LOLO FOREST PLANt.
310. Id.
311. Resources Ltd., 789 F. Supp. at 1537.
312. Id.
313. Id. (stating that "[p] laintifrs claim is not well taken and borders on the edge of frivolous).
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B. Forest Plan Litigation Overview
1. Litigation over Forest Plans
The procedural foundation of NFMA is the requirement that each
national forest prepare and implement a forest-wide land and resource
management plan.3 14 Once adopted, the forest plan serves as a blueprint
that controls management decisions. 315 The forest planning process, after
substantial effort, controversy, and expense, is now complete. With the
exception of the Pacific Northwest, final forest plans are in place for each
national forest. Forest plans have generated less litigation than one would
have predicted several years ago. While every forest plan has been subject
to administrative appeal,31 6 only a handful have been subjected to judicial
review.
Since forest plans are prepared in accordance with NEPA, 1 7 and
must conform to the substantive requirements of the NFMA as well, 318
many forest-plan appeals raise issues under both statutes. 319 Some appeals
are sophisticated legal efforts with expert affidavits and substantial
supporting documentation.320 Others are "citizen" appeals, organized by
local grassroots groups and citizens on both sides of the environmental
fence.
One of the unresolved issues concerning forest plans is their "es-
sence," that is, are they programmatic documents with no impact until
implemented as projects, or do they represent an "irretrievable commit-
ment of resources"? The Forest Service has consistently taken the position
that forest plans do not have "on-the-ground" consequences.321 Forest
314. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
315. 16U.S.C§ 1604(i);36C.F.R.§ 210(e);see also CitizensforEnvtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp.
at 976-78.
316. To appreciate the Forest Service's frustration over the appeals process, one must
understand the sheer magnitude of work generated by forest plan appeals. Reaching a peak in the late
1980s, the appeals created a mini-industry of local groups, resource consultants, and attorneys, and
spawned a number of conferences and workshops as well. For example, the Wilderness Society set up a
forest plan appeal center, publishing regular newsletters and booklets. See, e.g., THE WILDERNESS
SOCIETY, ISSUES TO RAISE IN FOREST PLAN APPEALS (1986). On the west coast, Randal O'Toole and
his Cascade Holistic Economic Consultants (CHEC) provided consultation on numerous forest plan
appeals, mostly on timber economics and an analysis of how FORPLAN was applied on individual
forests. See, e.g., Bitterroot Forest Plan Appeal # 2215 (on file with author).
317. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1) states that NEPA applies to the forest planning process. The
regulations require that each forest plan be accompanied by a draft and final EIS. 36 C.F.R.
§ 219.10(b).
318. 16 U.S.C. § 1604.
319. See, e.g., Kootenai Forest Plan Appeal # 2117, Bitterroot National Forest Plan Appeal #
2215 (on file with the author).
320. See, e.g., Flathead Forest Plan Appeal # 1513.
321. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation Leaguev. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Forest Service arguing that agency action can be challenged only at project level because forest plans
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plans, according to the agency, are therefore immune from judicial review
on the basis of standing and ripeness,3 22 and because the substantive
provisions of the NFMA and disclosure requirements of NEPA do not
apply until individual timber sales are proposed.323 Environmental and
industry group plaintiffs have taken the opposite view: that forest plans
make decisions with profound environmental consequences.3 2 The posi-
tion of the judiciary lies somewhere in between.
This problem is illuminated by the vexing question of the relationship
of forest plans to annual timber outputs. One resource output analyzed
during forest planning is the allowable timber sale quantity (ASQ). The
ASQ, as defined in the regulations, is the maximum amount of timber that
can be offered for sale during the time period specified in the forest plan.325
The NFMA does not mandate that the ASQ will be sold on any particular
forest in a particular year, and the forest plans clearly state that the ASQ is
not a guaranteed sale amount.3 26 The Forest Service has consistently taken
the position that the ASQ is not a hard and fast number and does not
control resource decisions. 27
However, both environmental and industry groups know that the
ASQ is not an empty number; it means something. The timber industry
relies on the ASQ as an indication of how much timber will be sold. This
reliance led to litigation in Wyoming in a pre-forest plan case, when the
Forest Service did not offer timber volumes projected in the Timber
Management Plan (TMP) for the Bridger-Teton National Forest.3 2 The
district court held that the Forest Service was not bound to offer volumes
projected in the TMP, classifying the plan as a "general statement of
policy" which did not interfere with the agency's discretion to offer less
do not make irretrievable commitment of resources).
322. Id. at 1515-19; see also infra notes 389-482 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g, Idaho Conservation Leaguev. Mumma, 21 Envt. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 20,666,
20,668 (D. Mont. Aug. 8, 1990).
324. See, e.g., Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. U.S Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993);
Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
325. 36 C.F.R. § 219.3. For planning purposes, the ASQ is computed on a ten-year basis. The
annual ASQ is 1 / 10th of the ten-year ASQ. A forest may offer more than the predicted ASQ in a given
year, but cannot exceed the ten-year total. See, e.g.. LOL FORESt PLAN, supra note 309, at 11-6. US.
FOREST SERVICE, LoLO FORESr PLAN RECORD OF DECISION 8 (1986).
326. For example, the Beaverhead National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan
defines ASQ as "[t]he quantity of timber that may be sold from the area of suitable land covered by the
Forest Plan for a time period specified by the plan." BEAVERHEAD FOREST PLAN. supra note 86. at
VIII-1. In the Record of Decision for the Beaverhead Forest Plan, the Regional Forester stated that
"projected production levels here for the various resources are not the decision in and of themselves.
Although all outputs can be accomplished ... the Forest Plan does not guarantee that they will be
accomplished." U.S. FOREST SERVICE, BEAVERHEAD NAT'L FOREST, RECORD OF DECISION 3 (1986).
327. See, e.g., Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Wyo. 1988);
Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1399.
328. Intermountain Forest Indus., 683 F. Supp. at 1322.
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timber a.32 This holding is directly applicable to the ASQ in forest plans,
and is one reason why the timber industry has not challenged the Forest
Service in court when timber volumes have fallen below the ASQ levels set
in forest plans.
On the other hand, as the Ninth Circuit has stated, the ASQ cannot
"be drawn out of a hat. '3 30 In Resources Limited, Inc. v. Robertson, the
ASQ was projected at a level that conflicted with standards designed to
protect grizzly bears. Even though the Forest Service took the position that
the ASQ is only a projection, and that site-specific decisions would control
the amount of timber harvested, the court found that the selection of the
ASQ "perhaps more than any other element of forest-wide planning, is
critical in providing 'long-term direction.' "331 Because the Forest Ser-
vice's own studies raised questions about the conflict between the ASQ and
its effects on the grizzly bear, the court determined the ASQ to be arbitrary
and capricious.33 2
The cattle industry raised a concern similar to that voiced by the
timber industry with respect to grazing levels set in forest plans. Grazing
levels, signified by AUMs (Animal Unit Months),33 3 are specified in the
forest plan, like the ASQ. When the Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada
adopted its forest plan in 1986, projected grazing levels were similar to pre-
plan levels. In fact, one of the goals in the forest plan was to maintain
current grazing levels. The plan left open the possibility of reduced grazing
in the future, however, to protect watersheds.34 When it appeared that
implementation of the plan would result in decreased grazing, the Nevada
Land Action Association sued, claiming the forest plan did not disclose the
subsequent reduction in grazing. The district court granted summary
judgment for the Forest Service.3 5 The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs
lacked standing under NEPA, and affirmed summary judgment on all
other claims,3 36 upholding the grazing levels in the forest plan as profes-
sional estimations by range managers familiar with the land and the
applicable management standards.33 The court held, in effect, that the
Forest Service is not bound to provide commodity outputs equal to those
329. Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). The court relied on both the Organic Act and MUSY as
affirmed in NFMA to conclude that the Forest Service still retains broad discretion in determining the
amount of timber it actually offers for sale. Id. at 1336-39.
330. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1399.
331. Id. at 1400.
332. Id.
333. An AUM is defined as the amount of forage eaten by a mature cow or the equivalent in one
month, which is approximately 1,000 pounds. See Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 717 n.4.
334. Id. at 718.
335. Id. at 715.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 717.
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projected in the forest plan when the plan has indicated that those outputs
may be reduced to meet other forest plan goals, such as the protection of
range and riparian lands.3 38
On the one hand, resource projections in forest plans are not binding
commitments. Forest plans are programmatic blueprints to guide, but not
control, on-the-ground decisions. In this sense, forest plans do not mandate
decisions about the use of resources. Rather, they guide future decisions. 339
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit decision in Resources Limited
signifies that the ASQ levels set forth in forest plans are not meaningless
numbers, and must be consistent with the protection of other resources,
such as the grizzly bear.
Overall, the Forest Service has prevailed in litigation over the
adequacy of forest plans. There are several reasons for this. First, it is
difficult to ask a court to fault the agency for a programmatic document
when the alleged environmental harm, in the form of timber sales or
grazing allotments, for example, will not occur until after the plan is
implemented. Second, the Forest Service has settled forest plan appeals
both before and during litigation, thus avoiding judicial review of some of
the more blatant violations of the law.34 ' Third, the Forest Service has
amended some plans, and in the case of the Lolo National Forest,
drastically reduced the ASQ, thereby eliminating the primary concern of
environmental groups.3 '
338. Id. at 718.
339. See generally MICHAEL J. GIPPERT & VINCENT L. DEWiTrE, FOREST PLAN IbtPLEtENTA-
TION: GATEWAY TO COMPLIANCE WITH NFMA, NEPA AND OTHER FEDERAL FNVItRONMENTAL
LAWS 16-20 (1990) (copy on file with author).
340. An example of this is the recent settlement of the Clearwater Forest Plan appeal. After the
Forest Service failed to act on the administrative appeal for four years, a coalition of groups filed suit.
Wilderness Society v. Robertson, Civ. No. 93-0043-S-HLR (D. Idaho 1993). This litigation settled
immediately, resulting in a reduction of the ASQ and increased protection for fish and wildlife. See
Letter from James L. Caswell, Forest Supervisor, Clearwater National Forest, US. Dep't otAgric, to
"interested citizens" (Oct. 8, 1993) (on file with author).
341. The Lolo Forest Plan was appealed by a number of groups, including the National Wildlife
Federation and the Montana Wilderness Association. Many of the issues raised by plaintiffs grew from
a perception that the forest plan authorized unrealistically high timber harvest levels. After the appeal
was filed, Forest Supervisor Orville Daniels announced that the forest could not meet the forest plan's
ASQ of 107 mmbf per year, and stated that the forest would offer an average of 51 million board feet
per year from 1993-96. Reasons given for the reduction included accelerated logging on intermingled
corporate lands, threats to wildlife and water quality standards, difficulty in harvesting from roadless
lands, improper assumptions used by FORPLAN in designated the ASQ. Supervisor Daniels
concluded by stating that the Llo would amend the forest plan to reflect these changes. See Letter from
Orville Daniels, Forest Supervisor, Lolo National Forest, to "concerned citizens" (Sept. 11. 1991) (on
file with author).
The forest plan appeal was eventually denied, but plaintiffs decided not to pursue judicial review in
part because the reduction in ASQ achieved many of the goals sought in the forest plan appeal.
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2. Litigation over Forest Plan Environmental Impact Statements
In addition to challenging resource and land use allocation decisions
contained in forest plans, plaintiffs suing over forest plans usually chal-
lenge the accompanying Environmental Impact Statements. Courts have
repeatedly upheld the adequacy of the statements.3 42
Plaintiffs often demand that forest plan EISs contain more specific
information about the plan's environmental consequences. 43 Courts have
agreed with the Forest Service, however, that a forest plan EIS, like its
accompanying forest plan, is a broad programmatic document, and that
more detailed evaluation of environmental consequences will occur in EAs
or EISs designed for specific projects.344 While the agency may properly
defer detailed analysis of impacts to the project level, an adequate forest-
wide EIS must still fully comply with NEPA. 45
The Forest Service appears to have solved, at least in part, one of its
most persistent NEPA problems through the preparation of forest plan
EISs. One of the most difficult and controversial issues for the Forest
Service in the past two decades has been whether to develop or protect
roadless lands within the National Forest System. The Wilderness Act of
1964346 designated 9.1 million acres as wilderness under the terms of the
Act, and required the Forest Service to study an additional 5.4 million
acres for potential inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation
System. 3 47 The Forest Service voluntarily undertook a nationwide review
of the suitability of other lands for wilderness in 1967. This process, the
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE I), became embroiled in
litigation. RARE I legal decisions had a significant impact on the NFMA
forest planning process two decades later.
The Forest Service released its RARE I study in 1972, and the Sierra
Club and others promptly sued, alleging the Forest Service failed to
comply with NEPA.348 In 1973, the Forest Service responded with a
nationwide EIS, which selected less than 20% of the roadless lands for
342. See, e.g., Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d 1394; Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d
1508 (9th Cir. 1991); Robertson 111, 810 F.Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
343. See. e.g., Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1400-02.
344. See generally Robertson II1, 810 F. Supp. 1021; Robertson I, 784 F. Supp. at 602-03.
345. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1401.
346. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136.
347. 16 U.S. C. §§ 1132 (a), (b). The Forest Service was an early leader among federal
agencies. In 1924, Aldo Leopold convinced his agency to set aside 700,000 acres of the Gila National
Forest in New Mexico. Bob Marshall, chief of the agency's Division of Recreation in the 1930s, also
championed the protection of undeveloped portions of the National Forests.
348. Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envt. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 20,071 (N.D. Cal. Aug 29, 1972)
(enjoining future timber sales in roadless areas); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973) (enjoining existing timber sale contracts in roadless areas).
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further study.34 9 The Carter Administration essentially abandoned RARE
I and began a more comprehensive analysis, dubbed RARE II, which was
undertaken shortly after NFMA's passage.3 50 The RARE II Final EIS was
released in 1979. It inventoried 62 million acres of roadless lands and
allocated 15 million acres to wilderness, 10.8 million acres to further
planning, and designated 36 million acres as nonwilderness. Litigation
again ensued, resulting in the landmark decision, California v. Block.3 51 In
Block, the Forest Service argued that the RARE II EIS complied with
NEPA, and alternatively, that NFMA exempted the EIS from having to
comply with NEPA in the first place.5 2 The Ninth Circuit did not give
either argument much credence. It remanded the RARE II Final EIS for
further discussion of site-specific impacts to the inventoried roadless lands
and consideration of a more reasonable range of alternatives. 353
Block had profound implications for the Forest Service. Though the
Ninth Circuit's injunction prevented timber harvest and road construction
only on roadless lands in California,3 "the NEPA rationale was easily
applicable to all roadless lands within the National Forest System. Thus,
timber harvesting was essentially prevented on roadless lands where a site-
specific EIS was not in place, and even when an EIS was prepared,
injunctions were still issued.3 55 The Forest Service responded by undertak-
ing a new round of NEPA analysis, RARE III, to remedy the deficiencies
in its RARE II analysig. The RARE III analysis was incorporated into
each forest plan EIS, and contained much more site-specific information
about each roadless area. For example, forest plans EISs for Idaho and
Montana contained descriptions of each roadless area, including its
349. RARE I inventoried 56 million acres of roadless lands within the National Forest System,
and recommended 12.3 million acres for further study. CoGINs ET AL, supra note 6. at 1041.
350. Id.
351. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982), aff g in part. revg in part. California v. Bergland, 483 F.
Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
352. Block, 690 F.2d at 774-75.
353. Id. at 760-69. The court listed several areas in which the EIS was inadequate, including its
failure to comprehensively describe individual roadless areas, failure to disclose the impacts of
nonwilderness designation, failure to assess the wilderness value of each area in terms of tourism and
recreation, and failure to balance the economic benefits of wilderness designation versus development.
The RARE II EIS also lacked an adequate range of alternative scenarios for preservation rather
than development. All of the alternatives considered by the Forest Service considered developing at
least 37 % of the lands. Id. at 765. The Forest Service "uncritically assumes that a substantial portion of
the RARE II lands should be developed and considers on those alternatives with that end result." Id. at
767. The court held this violates NEPA's mandate to consider a reasonable range of alternative
scenarios. Id.
354. 690 F.2d at 753.
355. See, e.g., Friends of the Bitterrootv. U.S. Forest Service, CV 90-76-BU (D. Mont. July 30,
1991) (granting a preliminary injunction against timber sales in RARE II areas for failure to consider
an alternative to the proposed sale that preserved RARE 11 lands but allowed cutting on other lands
within the sale area).
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wilderness suitability, resource trade-offs from development versus preser-
vation, and the consequences of implementing the forest plan's manage-
ment prescription for the area."'6
Congress intervened in the roadless issue during the forest planning
process by passing wilderness legislation for many of the western states
directly affected by Block. 57 In states where legislation was passed, the
issue of NEPA compliance for roadless areas was addressed through
"release language" which, in various forms, absolved the Forest Service
from its obligation to do an EIS on the question of wilderness suitability
prior to developing roadless lands. While release language does not always
preclude judicial review of NEPA claims for development of roadless
lands,358 it has remedied the Block deficiencies in the RARE II analysis.
However, in states where no wilderness legislation was passed, notably
Idaho and Montana, the issue was left to be resolved through the forest
planning process and the RARE III analysis contained in the forest plans.
Not surprisingly, the RARE III analysis contained in the forest plans
was the subject of many forest-plan administrative appeals. 359 A case was
brought in federal district court in Montana to test the sufficiency of the
Idaho Panhandle EIS's RARE III analysis."' ° The district court affirmed
the sufficiency of the forest plan's analysis of the roadless lands, and further
held that the forest plan presented a reasonable range of alternatives as to
the designation of some lands for wilderness and the release of other
roadless lands for other purposes.36' The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court.3 62 This holding, in effect, determined that the Forest Service had
finally complied with NEPA on the issue of wilderness suitability for
roadless lands, and ended a twenty-year legal battle over this still-
356. See, e.g., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, APPENDIX C, LOLO
NAT'L FOREST PLAN (1986). Thirty-six roadless areas are identified, mapped, described, and analyzed
for their wilderness suitability. The description and analysis is 456 pages long. The roadless-lands
analysis is presented in a manner to meet the deficiencies enumerated in California v. Block. The
various alternatives recommend 2% to 100% of roadless lands as wilderness. Id.
357. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 6, at 1053.
358. See National Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Service, 4 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1993). In
National Audubon Soc'y, the Forest Service asserted that release language in the Oregon Wilderness
Act precluded the need for an EIS on timber sales in roadless lands. The court held that while Congress
may have precluded further review of wilderness suitability, it had not precluded the need for full
compliance with NEPA on other impacts of the proposed projects. Id. at 837. An EIS may be required
if those impacts are deemed significant. See id.
359. The author is personally familiar with the appeals of all forest plans in Montana; the
roadless issue was a major point in every one. Environmental groups argued that the RARE III analysis
was prepared in "cookbook" fashion simply to meet the dictates of California v. Block, and that the
final wilderness recommendations were too low.
360. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 21 Envt. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 20,666 (D. Mont.
Aug. 8, 1990).
361. Id. at 20,668-69.
362. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
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contentious issue.
In the absence of a forest plan or accompanying EIS, a project-level
Environmental Assessment cannot be "tiered" to anything. 3 3 Thus, the
Forest Service may be challenged successfully under NEPA for failing to
prepare an EIS in the face of significant environmental consequences from
timber sales.3 ' But once a forest plan has been adopted, the Forest Service
has successfully argued that timber-sale EAs are "tiered" to the program-
matic forest plan EIS, obviating the need for a site-specific EIS.36 5
Forest Plan EIS challenges are often tied to NFMA claims. Overall,
the Forest Service has been even more successful in defending its NEPA
compliance on the forest plan level than with defending substantive
NFMA claims.366 This contrasts with the agency's NEPA compliance at
the project level, where plaintiffs have successfully challenged EAs and
EISs.367
3. Litigation over Forest Plan Standards and Guidelines
Forest plans contain management standards and guidelines that
regulate the entire spectrum of forest uses, from timber harvest, to wildlife
protection, to recreation. The NFMA establishes a mandatory duty to
insure that all forest activities are consistent with forest plans, 86 including
compliance with forest plan standards.36 9 Reviewing courts have upheld
363. The concept of tiering an EA to an EIS is set forth in 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(i), 1502.4(d).
1502.20,1508.28 (1993). The ForestService may relyon the earlier EIS. thereby eliminating the need
to re-examine environmental issues already discussed there.
364. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190. 1191 (9th Cir. 1988).
365. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 92-5101 (D.S.D. Oct. 28, 1993). appeal
docketed, No. 94-1005 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1993). On appeal, plaintiffs assert that a forest plan EIS
which does not specifically address a particular impact cannot provide a basis for ticring, and a new EIS
may therefore be required. The impact which the EIS failed to address in this case was habitat
fragmentation.
366. See, e.g., Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho
Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992); Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp.
1526 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (upholding forest plan EISs).
367. For a representative sample of NEPA project-level cases that the Forest Service has lost,
see National Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Service, 4 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Oregon
Wilderness Act does not preclude possible need for EIS on timbersales in roadless areas); Sierra Club
v. U.S. Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that because timber sales may cause
significant impacts on old growth sequoias, EIS rather than EA is required before logging proceeds);
Save the Yaak v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that EA on road paving project
inadequatewhen project facilitates substantial timber harvest program);Thomas v. Peterson. 753 F.2d
754 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that cumulative impacts of logging road and related timber sale must be
addressed).
368. NFMA provides that "[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for
the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands shall be consistent with the land management
plans." 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (emphasis added); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e).
369. For example, the Black Hilis National Forest Plan states, "The management rcquiremehts
in this Section [delineating standards and guidelines] set the baseline conditions that must be
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this requirement; the forest plan is implemented through site-specific
projects, "and all projects must be consistent with the LRMP [Land and
Resource Management Plan]. '"70
In 1990, the Chief of the Forest Service issued a directive emphasizing
the non-discretionary nature of forest plan standards and guidelines:
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind about which takes
precedence if there is a conflict between standards and guidelines
and program outputs: if there is a conflict between standards and
guidelines and program outputs; we expect every project to be in
full compliance with standards and guidelines as set forth in
Forest Plans.37'
Forest plan standards and guidelines range from broad statements of
policy 372 to specific resource requirements that affect management deci-
sions on an acre-by-acre basis. 3 While forest managers must insure that
projects such as timber sales, grazing permits and special uses comply with
the forest plan, the situations in which forest plan standards and guidelines
can be enforced in court are not clear.
The issue has been addressed in only a few cases. In timber sale
litigation in South Dakota, the Sierra Club sued over the Forest Service's
lack of compliance with forest plan standards for snags, old growth and
white-tailed deer cover.374 The harvest area was not in compliance with
forest plan standards at the time the timber sale project was approved. The
Sierra Club argued that further harvest and related road construction
should not occur until the timber sale area was in compliance with forest
plan standards.
The district court disagreed, finding that the Forest Service was
taking reasonable actions in light of existing conditions by taking steps to
insure future compliance with forest plan standards.37 In its opinion, the
maintained throughout the Forest in carrying out the Forest Plan." U.S. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRIC., BLACK HILLS NAT'L FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 111-10 (1983).
370. Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970,977 (D. Colo. 1989); see also
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 554 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
371. F. Dale Robertson, Forest Plan Implementation (Feb 23, 1990) (memorandum to regional
foresters) (unpublished) (copy on file with author).
372. See, e.g., BEAVERHEAD NAT'L FOREST PLAN, supra note 86, at 11-30 (stating in Watershed
Standard No. 3 that all timber sales will comply with state water quality laws).
373. For example, to provide habitat for cavity-dwelling bird species, the Black Hills National
Forest snag management standard requires, at a minimum, 4-6 snags per 10 acres of the following
minimum diameters where biologically feasible: ponderosa pine, spruce, aspen, and oak: 8 inches dbh.
BLACK HILLS NAT'L FOREST PLAN, supra note 369, at 111-12.
374. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 92-5101 (D.S.D. Oct. 28, 1993).
375. Id., slip op. at 40-41. For example, the sale area contained only I % old growth, while the
forest plan standard required 5 %. The Forest Service designated certain acres as "future old growth"
by labeling such areas on the map. Plaintiffs argued that this designation was non-binding, and that the
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court made somewhat contradictory statements about the enforceability of
forest plan standards. For example, it acknowledged the need for the
Forest Service to comply with forest plan standards, 37  but then stated, "It
is also important to remember that the Forest Plan standards represent
forest conditions which the Forest Plan desires the forest to attain in the
future."3 7 This decision does not shed much light on the enforceability of
forest plan standards.
By contrast, the Montana District Court has held that forest plan
standards on the Flathead National Forest "operate as parameters within
which all future development must take place. 3 7 8 In Swan View Coalition
v. Turner, plaintiffs sought to overturn the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's
biological opinion on the Flathead National Forest Plan.3 79 The gravamen
of plaintiffs' claim was that the biological opinion failed to consider the
site-specific impacts of forest plan implementation with respect to grizzly
bears and their habitat. 80
The district court reviewed numerous provisions designed to protect
grizzly bears that were incorporated into the forest plan's standards,
including the Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee Guidelines. 8 ' Because
the standards act as "safeguard mechanisms" to prevent developments
such as timber sales from going forward if they violate forest plan
standards, the court found no need for a more detailed biological opinion at
the time the forest plan was adopted. 82 The Forest Service's commitment
to follow forest plan standards, coupled with the Fish and Wildlife
Service's commitment to prepare a site-specific biological opinion if a
future project departed from those standards, assured the court that future
impacts would be properly addressed at the time future development
continued loss of mature timber delayed compliance with old-growth standards. The court found the
Forest Service actions reasonable because "old growth cannot be created overnight." and because by
cutting trees, the Forest Service was meeting forest plan standards for creating wildlife forage areas.
Id.
376. Id. af 44.
377. Id. at 46.
378. Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 935 (D. Mont. 1992).
379. Id. at 933. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act requires a biological opinion. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b)(3)(A). In Swan View Coalition, the Forest Service determined that the forest plan might
affect grizzly bears, a threatened species, and therefore prepared a biological opinion. Plaintiffs
claimed the opinion was inadequate. Id. at 932-33.
380. Id. at 932-33.
381. Id. at 933. The Interagency Grizzly Bear Committee (IGBC) is a multi-agcncy group that
promulgated regional land management standards designed to assist grizzly-bear recovery to the point
where the bears no longer need the protection of the Endangered Species Act. IG BC standards adopted
in the Flathead Forest Plan included scheduling timber harvests at times that are the least disruptive to
bears, and maintaining hiding and thermal cover at proper levels after timber sale projects are
completed. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FLATHEAD NAT'L FOREST LAND AND RESOURCE MA.%AGF-MrT
PLAN (1985).
382. Swan View Coalition, 824 F. Supp. at 935.
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occurred.38 3
Swan View Coalition presents the strongest language to date on the
binding nature of forest plan standards. Forest plans would be largely
meaningless if land managers were free to ignore their standards and
guidelines. Forest plan standards will likely play a much greater role in
NFMA litigation in the future. In the northern Rockies alone, for example,
cases are pending over grazing standards on the Beaverhead National
Forest,384 management standards for wild and scenic portions of the
Salmon River,3 85 and forest plan standards for grizzly bears on the
Flathead National Forest.386 Swan View Coalition defines the relationship
between forest plan standards and management activities, and correctly
enforces the underlying logic of forest plan standards. Courts should follow
this interpretation and require the agency to adhere to management
standards adopted through the forest planning process.
III. PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES
Unlike other environmental statutes, NFMA does not have a citizen-
suit provision or other provision allowing judicial review.381 Judicial review
under NFMA must be secured under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 88 which permits aggrieved persons to challenge administrative
actions and allows reviewing courts to set those actions aside.
Judicial review under the NFMA has taken two basic tracks. One line
of cases involves litigation over forest plans, i.e., challenges to a forest plan
as violating NFMA, and/or to the accompanying EIS as violating NEPA.
The other line of cases focuses on challenges to specific actions, usually
timber sales.
A. Getting to the Courthouse Door
Before a court ever gets to the merits of a NFMA claim, plaintiffs
must first overcome a series of obstacles. These hurdles include standing,
ripeness of the issue for judicial review, and exhaustion of administrative
remedies. All operate to limit, and sometimes prevent, judicial review in
NFMA cases. The Forest Service has frequently invoked these defenses,
resulting in a fairly well developed body of law in these areas in less than a
decade.
383. Id. at 934.
384. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Kulesza, No. CV-94-23-BU (D. Mont. filed March 30, 1994).
385. Wilderness Watch v. United States, No. 91-103-M-CCL (D. Mont. filed Aug. 5, 1991).
386. Swan View Coalition, 824 F. Supp 923.
387. See. e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (allowing private citizens to seek judicial review for
violations of the Endangered Species Act).
388. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
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1. Standing
Standing is a constitutional requirement arising from the Article III
"case or controversy" requirement. 8  Standing asks whether a court has
subject matter jurisdiction to hear a particular case3 90 and is one element of
a court's requirement that there be a "justiciable" controversy. 91 It is not a
particularly clear doctrine, making it difficult for both litigants and judges
to articulate and analyze.3 9 2 Standing is reviewed de novo;393 the nature of
the review depends upon the plaintiff's burden of proof at the relevant
procedural stage.3"
To prove constitutional standing, a plaintiff must first demonstrate an
"injury in fact"; second, an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's
conduct; and third, an injury that is redressable by the court. 95 An injury
in fact is "an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized,.., and (b) 'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or
389. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, c!. 1.
390. Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 807 (11 th
Cir. 1993). Standing can therefore be raised at any time, and can be raised by the court on its own
motion, as was done in Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers. Id. at 807 n.9.
391. Justiciability is a term of art encompassing two major limitations placed on federal courts
by the case or controversy doctrine: that the courts limit themselves to questions presented in an
adversarial context, and that the questions be capable of being resolved through the judicial process.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Plaintiffs who raise general grievances about actions or
inactions of the government, for example, but who are not uniquely affected or injured by the action or
inaction, do not satisfy the Article III standing requirements. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112
S.Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992).
392. The Ninth Circuit recently observed, "Through its tangled and fluctuating formulations,
the doctrine of standing might well have become 'a word game played by secret rules..., " Idaho
Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508,1513 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S.at 129)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
393. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513; Region 8 Forest Service Timber
Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 806.
394. The nature of review reflects the procedural requirements of the litigation stage. At the
motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff can rest on the allegations of thecomplaint, which must be taken as
true. FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(e); Defenders of Wildlife, 12 S.Ct. at 2137; accord Region 8 Forest Service
Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 806. At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must set forth
specific facts via affidavit. Defenders of Wildlife, 1 12 S.Ct. at 2137; accord Wind River Multiple-Use
Advocates v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (D. Wyo. 1993).
395. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984). The Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff
must have a "personal stake in the outcome," Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186,204 (1962). which developed
into the first two components of the three-part test: 1) injury to the plaintiff, 2) with a "fairly traceable"
causal connection between the alleged conduct and the injury. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (plaintiffs challenging Price-Anderson Act held to have
standing).
After Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and Defenders of WIldlife, 112
S.Ct. 2130, plaintiffs must include affidavits specifying their use and enjoyment of particular areas
affected by the agency action. These affidavits have been found to be sufficient even when they are
limited in their detail about particular areas due to the fact that the forest plan does not specify exact
areas of development. See Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1517.
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'hypothetical." "36 An interest in the proper administration of the laws is
not sufficiently "concrete" for standing purposes. 97 Therefore, a plaintiff
who seeks judicial review of an agency action, such as a forest plan, must
adduce facts which show that the plaintiff will suffer personal harm as a
result of the agency's allegedly illegal action in order to have standing to
bring the suit.
Some statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA),3 98 contain
"citizen-suit" provisions allowing private citizens to commence civil
litigation against other individuals allegedly violating the statute, or
against the applicable agency secretary for failing to follow or apply the
statute.39 9 These provisions do not obviate the need for plaintiffs to
establish Article III standing, however.400 Because neither NEPA nor
NFMA contain citizen-suit provisions, the authority for judicial review
under those statutes arises from the APA.4 0 1 The standing inquiry
therefore looks not only at the constitutional requirements, but also at the
APA requirements. 0 2 Specifically, under the APA, a plaintiff must
identify a final agency action that has injured him, and must show that he
has been "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the action within the
meaning of the statute the plaintiff claims is being violated.40 3 To be
"adversely affected," the plaintiff's injury must fall within the "zone of
interests" protected by the statute at issue.04 Finally, some courts will also
look for "associational standing" for voluntary membership
organizations.° 3
In 1972, the Supreme Court held that injury to a person's aesthetic or
recreational interests satisfied the "injury-in-fact" requirement .4 0  Al-
though the plaintiffs were found to lack standing in Sierra Club v.
Morton, °7 the Court indicated that an environmental group could have
396. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted).
397. Id. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
398.- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543.
399. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1).
400. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at 2145.
401. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
402. See, e.g., Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates, 835 F. Supp. at 1368. See also George K.
Pash, NEPA: As Procedure It Stands, As Procedure It Falls: Standing and Substantive Review in
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 29 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 365, 370 (1993).
403. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990).
404. Id. at 883.
405. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Growers Advertisers Ass'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Sierra Clubv. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at
805 n.3.
406. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35. See also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) [hereinafter SCRAP].
407. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972).
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standing on behalf of its members." 8 The following year, the Court held
that an organization's allegations that members used certain areas for
recreation was sufficient to confer standing to challenge an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission allowing railroads to collect a
surcharge on freight rates for recyclable materials.409 Together, these
cases paved the way for litigation initiated by environmental-group
plaintiffs challenging federal agency actions.
Plaintiffs suing under NFMA usually challenge a forest plan, its
accompanying EIS or a timber sale. The standing jurisprudence applicable
to NFMA cases arises from two recent environmental standing cases,
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation410 and Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.11 In National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court held that
the affidavits submitted by two of plaintiff's members were not specific
enough to show that the members would be "adversely affected" by the
agency action.1 2 Although the Court acknowledged "there is some room
for debate as to how 'specific' must be the 'specific facts'" required to
overcome a summary judgment motion, it further stated that "averments
which state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified
portions of an immense tract of territory" were not sufficient. 41 3
Defenders of Wildlife addressed the constitutional requirement that
an injury be "actual or imminent."' 1' 4 The purpose of this requirement,
wrote Justice Scalia, is to "insure that the alleged injury is not too
speculative for Article III purposes."'"1 5 Both of these issues-specificity of
plaintiffs' affidavits and imminence of harm-became the focus of stand-
ing arguments in NFMA cases. One issue that was not called into question
by National Wildlife Federation or Defenders of Wildlife, however, was
the cognizability of an injury to an individual's "recreational or aesthetic
interest,"'"" which is in many ways the bedrock of environmental standing.
It is not surprising that the government tried to extend standing
408. Id. at 739.
409. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689-90; but see National Wildlife Fed'n. 497 U.S. at 889 (stating that
SCRAP's "expansive expression of what would suffice for § 702 review under its particular facts has
never since been emulated by this Court").
410. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
411. 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
412. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 888-89.
413. Id. at 889.
414. Defenders of Wildlife. 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38.
415. Id. at 2138 n.2.
416. National Wildlife Fed'n. 497 U.S. at 886 (stating that "recreational use and aesthetic
enjoyment" are among the interests the Federal Land and Policy Management Act and NEPA were
designed to protect); Defenders of Wildlife, 112S.Ct. at 2137 (stating that "the desire to use or observe
an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing" (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
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limitations to all plaintiffs challenging forest plans after National Wildlife
Federation and Defenders of Wildlife. What is surprising, however, is that
cases interpreting National Wildlife Federation and Defenders of Wild-
life have resulted in standing requirements that are, in many ways, no more
difficult for environmental-group plaintiffs than before. This is especially
true in the Ninth Circuit as a result of Idaho Conservation League v.
Mumma.41
In Idaho Conservation League, plaintiffs challenged the Flathead
National Forest Plan EIS's recommendation for roadless-area develop-
ment.418 The court framed the standing issue as whether the "alleged
procedural failure in the EIS" harmed the plaintiffs by creating a risk that
environmental impacts would be overlooked in the future.4 " Although the
court acknowledged that plaintiffs' claims involved alleged violations of
NEPA and NFMA,42 ° it analyzed the statutory component of plaintiffs'
standing under NEPA only.42 After finding that plaintiffs' interests were
legally protected by NEPA, 22 the court analyzed whether the potential
harm was too remote to be an injury in fact, and whether plaintiffs had
shown that their personal interests were affected.423 Each of these issues
can be framed in terms of the earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions, i.e.,
determining whether an injury is too "remote" addresses the Defenders of
Wildlife issue of whether the threatened harm is imminent, and determin-
ing whether the plaintiff's interests are personally affected goes to the
specificity of the affidavits discussed in National Wildlife Federation.
a) Remoteness of the Threatened Injury
The district court in Idaho Conservation League held that plaintiffs'
417. 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992); accord Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp.
1484, 1488 (W.D. Wash. 1992) ("[t]he threatened injury to plaintiffs from further logging of old
growth habitat for the spotted owl is concrete, specific, imminent, caused by the agency conduct in
question, and redressable by a favorable ruling); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703
(9th Cir. 1993) (threatened harm to owl viability from logging meets the three-part constitutional
standing test); Oregon Natural Resources v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Or. 1993).
418. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1512-13.
419. Id. at 1514 (citing Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484,491 (9th Cir. 1987).
420. Id. at 1512.
421. Id. at 1514-15. Given that the Ninth Circuit later held that NFMA standing cannot be
derived from NEPA standing, Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713, 716 n.2
(9th Cir. 1993), the court's analysis should extend to all relevant statutes rather than ending with the
first one under which plaintiff has standing.
422. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515. The Ninth Circuit generally begins its
environmental standing analyses by applying the APA "zone of interests" test to determine whether
plaintiffs' interests are legally protected by the statute being invoked. See, e.g., id. at 1514; Nevada
Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 716.
423. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515.
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alleged injury was "too speculative" for purposes of standing,' 2 reflecting
the language used by Justice Scalia in Defenders of Wildlife in discussing
imminence of injury. 25 The Ninth Circuit did not cite Defenders of
Wildlife in its discussion of remoteness, and held that a threatened injury
which is contingent upon intervening events is adequate to support
standing. 2 ' Even though the challenged Forest Service decision was not
irrevocable, it created the possibility that wilderness development would
occur, and "[p]ursuant to NEPA and NFMA, these are injuries that we
must deem immediate, not speculative."' 27
This was a significant ruling for plaintiffs challenging forest plans.
The Forest Service has consistently argued that a forest plan does not
constitute an "irretrievable commitment of resources," 28 but is instead
merely "direction to control future decisionmaking.' '429 On that basis, the
agency has argued that without any specific actions mandated by the plan,
a plaintiff's alleged injury is too speculative and remote to support
standing.430 That is, because the forest plan did not directly implement
timber sales in roadless areas, it did not create an injury in fact. If plaintiffs
want to challenge a specific development, the Forest Service has argued, it
can and should do so when that particular development is proposed.3 "
This argument persuaded the district court in Idaho Conservation
League, which noted that any future development would be subject to
NEPA, and would therefore require an EIS. 32 It has not persuaded many
424. Id.
425. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 n.2.
426. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515-16.
427. Id. at 1516.
428. This language is from the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (N EPA). 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C)(v) (1988).
429. See, e.g.. Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526, 1531 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (quoting
defendants' brief as stating that the plan "merely state[d] guidelines and parameters to be followed in
the event a project is undertaken"). The Marita court, however, like the Ninth Circuit, did not accept
the Forest Service's characterization of the plan, noting that it included a "whole array of exceedingly
specific management "prescriptions" that are in no sense conditional or optional." Id. See also
GiPPERT, supra note 339, at 20.
430. See, e.g. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515; Sierra Club v. Robertson. 764 F.
Supp. 546, 553 (W.D. Ark. 1991) [hereinafter Robertson 11 ("[T]he defendants essentially base this
part of their motion on the assertion that the LRMP and FEIS are of so little import that their approval
can neither injure the plaintiffs nor be described as any sort of action.").
431. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515.
432. Idaho Conservation Leaguev. Mumma, 21 Envt. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 20.666 (D. Mont.
Aug. 8,1990); accord Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1533-34 (D. Mont. 1991).
affd in part, rev'd in part, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993). In fact, the Forest Service usually does an
Environmental Assessment (EA), which it "tiers" onto the Forest Plan EIS. See supra note 363.
Frequently, unless the development is taking place in a roadless area, the EA will lead to a Finding of
No Significant Impact (FONSI), which means an EIS does not have to be prepared. The EA process,
unlike the EIS process, does not require public participation, although the Forest Service regularly
notifies interested parties.
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other courts, however.433 The Ninth Circuit relied on underlying statutes
to hold that the Forest Service has a particular statutory duty that is
represented by the development of a forest plan, and plaintiffs have a
corresponding statutory right.4 4 According to the court, "The standing
examination ... must focus on the likelihood that the defendant's action
will injure the plaintiffs in the sense contemplated by Congress.'435 The
injuries were deemed immediate because of rights and duties created by
NEPA and NFMA. 43 1 By casting the injury as immediate, not speculative,
the Ninth Circuit avoided a direct confrontation with the holding of
Defenders of Wildlife, although it is certainly arguable that Justice Scalia
would disagree with the court's reasoning.
b) Specificity of Plaintiff's Interest
The second issue raised in Idaho Conservation League was whether
plaintiffs had a sufficiently personal interest in the outcome of the agency
action. 4 7 Here, the Ninth Circuit immediately cited National Wildlife
Federation, but distinguished it on the facts.48 The National Wildlife
Federation plaintiffs simply stated that they used lands "in the vicinity of
lands that would be open to mining," while the Idaho Conservation League
plaintiffs named "specific areas they are accustomed to visit and enjoy. ' 9
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that no one could identify the specific
areas to be developed because those decisions would not be made until some
time in the future, but rather than use that to deny standing, the court said
the plaintiffs had provided all possible detail, and had adequately proved
that individual members would be injured. 440
As in the remoteness discussion, the Ninth Circuit appears to be more
willing to grant standing and decide the merits of the plaintiffs' case than to
deny judicial review until a specific project is proposed. Similarly, the
433. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515-16 (holding that the plan and
wilderness designation "represent important decisions"); Marita, 843 F. Supp. at 1531; Robertson 1,
764 F. Supp. at 554 (stating that the "Supreme Court in Lujan [v. National Wildlife Fed'n] clearly did
not intend to preclude review of a plan simply because a project level decision, in this case a particular
timber sale, has not been made"); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Speculation that logging might not occur because of as yet unknown intervening circumstances, or
because redrafting the EIS might not adopt the Secretary's decision to adopt the ISC strategy as its owl
management plan is not relevant to standing.").
434. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1516-17.
438. Id. at 1517.
439. Id.
440. Id.
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district court in Sierra Club v. Robertson (Robertson I)441 found that a
forest plan is mandated by NFMA, and that the EIS stated it was to be
used in making management decisions.",2 In granting standing, the court
construed the plaintiffs' challenge as one going not only to the validity of
the forest plan and its accompanying EIS, but to the management tools and
methods allowed by those documents as well. 4 3 Like the Ninth Circuit in
Idaho Conservation League, the district court in Robertson I appeared to
be troubled by the question, "If not now, when?""'
4 4
c) Industry-Group Plaintiffs
The Forest Service has consistently challenged the standing of all
plaintiffs, whether they represent industry or environmental interests.
Environmental group plaintiffs seeking judicial review under NFMA and
the APA have had little difficulty in proving standing, as long as they can
provide detailed affidavits which specify individuals' use of affected
areas. 445 Industry groups and user groups, however, such as multiple-use
advocates 446 or ranchers with grazing permits on forest land," 7 face a
much more difficult hurdle in standing challenges. 4 8 The difficulty for
441. 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
442. Robertson I, 764 F. Supp. at 554.
443. Id.
444. See id. at 554-55 (stating that "such a result would put plaintiffs in the unhappy, not to
mention costly, position of being required to file numerous complaints before getting to the stage where
judicial review could be granted"); Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516 ("To the extent that
the plan pre-determines the future, it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some point,
have standing to challenge. That point is now, or it is never.").
445. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513-18; accord Espy. 998 F.2d at 702-03;
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Or. 1993); Resources Ltd.. 8
F.3d at 1398. See also Susan L. Gordon, The Ninth Circuit Standing Requirementsfor Environmen-
tal Organizations, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 264 (1993); Pash. supra note 402.
446. Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. 1362,1368-69 (D. Wyo. 1993).
447. Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713,716 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that ranchers had standing to challenge forest plan under NFMA, but not NEPA).
448. See generally Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d 800; Nevada Land
Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 716 (stating that "a plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have
standing to challenge agency action under NEPA"); Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates. 835 F.
Supp. at 1368-69.
This is a troubling result. If the Forest Service is required to follow particular procedures under
NEPA, ESA, and NFMA, why should it matter whether an environmental-group plaintiff or an
industry-group plaintiff challenges the legality of the agency's actions? See William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 264-65 (1988) (rather than analyzing injury-in-fact, the
court should look to the underlying statute). The D.C. Circuit has reasoned that because "NEPA
creates a right to information on the environmental effects of government actions... any infringement
of that right constitutes a constitutionally cognizable injury, without further inquiry into causation or
redressability," but even then, the right to information under NEPA extends -only when the
information sought relates to the environmental interests that NEPA was intended to protect."
Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107. 123 (D.C. Cir.
1990). Justice Scalia has further stated that even "informational standing" under a procedural statute
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these plaintiffs is in establishing a legally protected interest, given that
NEPA and NFMA protect environmental values, not economic interests.
Neither MUSY nor NFMA requires forests to be managed primarily
for economic reasons.449 The NFMA regulations state that plans shall
"[p] rovide, so far as feasible, an even flow of national forest timber in order
to facilitate the stabilization of communities and of opportunities for
employment,"' 4 but the stabilization of local economies must be balanced
against timber management constraints.45' In addition, the "so far as
feasible" language divests the regulation of any absolute requirement that
the national forests be managed to promote local economies. 452 Some
industry- and user-group plaintiffs have argued that the Forest Service is
required to sell the Allowable Sale Quantity (ASQ) listed in each forest
plan.'53 However, the regulations state that targets set in the plans are
maximum amounts, 54 and more importantly, the courts have consistently
held that timber companies have no legally protected right to harvest
timber in the national forests in the future.4 5
Standing under NEPA appears to be more difficult for an industry- or
user-group plaintiff to prove than under NFMA, 5 and does not necessa-
rily result from standing under NFMA. 4 "5 The circuits that have addressed
the issue have come to similar conclusions, although via different routes.
The Ninth Circuit first analyzes the APA "zone of interests" protected by
the applicable statute, which eliminates standing for all plaintiffs asserting
economic-based injuries.5 8 The Eleventh Circuit, in one case with an
industry-group plaintiff, applied the three-part constitutional test as well
as the prudential standing test and found that the plaintiff lacked standing
under NEPA and NFMA. 59
does not eliminate the need for a plaintiff to prove personal injury. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at
2142 n.7.
449. Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1988).
450. 36 C.F.R. § 221.3(a)(3).
451. Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n, 683 F. Supp. at 1339.
452. Id.
453. See, e.g. Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates, 835 F. Supp. at 1365, 1371.
454. Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass'n, 683 F. Supp. at 1340 (relying on 36 C.F.R.
§ 221.3(a)(5) in reviewing a pre-NFMA plan); accord Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates, 835 F.
Supp. at 1371-72.
455. See Wind River Multiple Use Advocates, 835 F. Supp. at 1369; Intermountain Forest
Indus. Ass'n, 683 F. Supp. at 1340; Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 808.
456. Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 716 (stating that "a plaintiff who asserts purely
economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under NEPA").
457. Id. at 716 n.2.
458. Id. at 715-16. The Ninth Circuit took the same approach in Idaho Conservation League,
956 F.2d at 1514.
459. Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 808.
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d) Prudential and Associational Standing
Prudential standing involves judicially created policy requirements
which may, to some extent, overlap with constitutional standing require-
ments.4 60 Like constitutional standing, prudential standing has evolved
into a three-part test: first, that the plaintiff must assert its own rights and
interests, second, that the plaintiff may not plead "generalized grievances"
that are best left to the political branches of government, and third, that the
plaintiff's injury must fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the
statute in question.461 Congress can override the prudential standing
requirements by inserting a citizen suit provision in a legislative act.462
Prudential standing has been applied inconsistently in NFMA cases. In
general, it is rarely mentioned if the court is finding for the plaintiff4 65 and
almost always mentioned if the court is finding for the defendant.4 "'
Although rarely applied in NFMA cases,4 6 5 associational standing
consists of yet another three-part test: first, that the voluntary membership
organization's members "have standing to sue in their own right," second,
that the intejrests the group seeks to protect are "germane to the
organization's purpose," and third, that "neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested must require the participation of the association's individ-
ual members. ' 66
While standing has been a central issue in NFMA litigation, it has
generally not prevented judicial review for environmental-group plaintiffs.
Unless courts recognize a legally protected interest in all citizens seeking to
enforce procedural statutes,467 industry- and user-group plaintiffs face an
almost insurmountable obstacle in proving standing under NEPA.408 In
the Ninth Circuit, it appears such plaintiffs will be able to establish
460. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State.
Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
461.. Id.; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); accord Idaho Conservation League, 956
F.2d at 1513; Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 806-07.
462. Pash, supra note 402, at 370. See also supra notes 387, 398-400 and accompanying text.
463. See Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1513-18; Resources Ltd.. 8 F.3d at 1397-98;
Espy, 998 F.2d at 702-03; Moseley, 798 F. Supp. at 1476.
464. See Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 805; Wind River Multiple-
Use Advocates, 835 F. Supp. at 1367.
465. In fact, it has only been mentioned in a few NFMA cases, but never actually applied. See.
e.g., Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers, 993 F.2d at 805 n.3.
466. Id. (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
467. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.. 901 F.2d 107,
123 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
468. The likelihood of this occurring at the U.S. Supreme Court may depend upon Justice
Scalia's influence over his colleagues. Justice Scalia adheres to strict standing requirements, including
the apparent belief that procedural injuries are not adequate to give rise to standing. See Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. at 2143 nn. 7-8; see also Pash, supra note 402, at 375.
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standing under NFMA.46" 9 However, the full impact of such a bifurcation is
unclear, given that many NFMA cases include a challenge to the EIS that
accompanies the forest plan, and plaintiffs lacking standing under NEPA
cannot challenge the EIS except to the extent that it violates NFMA.
2. Ripeness
Ripeness is closely related to standing, as it, too, arises from the
Article III "case or controversy" requirement."" The Forest Service's
claim that a forest plan is a programmatic document lacking any specific
action creating an injury leads to the contention that the forest plan itself
does not present any issues that are "ripe" for review.4"7 In National
Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the
Interior's reclassification of lands was not a final agency action under the
APA,4 72 and therefore was not ripe for review.473 The announcement of the
agency's intent to grant permission for activities such as mining was not a
"final agency action" because no permit had actually been granted.7 4
Until that time, "it is impossible to tell where or whether mining activities
will occur," or "whether mining activities will even be permissible.' 4 5 The
rule as stated in National Wildlife Federation is that "[e]xcept where
Congress explicitly provides for our correction of the administrative
process at a higher level of generality, [courts] intervene in the administra-
tion of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific 'final agency
action' has an actual or immediately threatened effect.' 4 6
In Idaho Conservation League, the defendants argued that National
Wildlife Federation applied, and the forest plans would not be ripe for
review until the Forest Service authorized site-specific actions. 47 7 The
Ninth Circuit distinguished National Wildlife Federation from Idaho
Conservation League on the basis that "the ICL is not challenging an
entire program . . . but rather their implementation in a particular
instance. 4 18 The court then went on to say, "We emphasize once again
469. Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 716 n.2.
470. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
471. For example, in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1993), the
Forest Service contended that a challenge to its owl management plan would not be ripe until a specific
timber sale was authorized pursuant to the plan. Similar arguments were made in Idaho Conservation
League, 956 F.2d at 1518-19, and Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1398.
472. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 890; see also 5 U.S.C. § 702.
473. 497 U.S. at 891.
474. Id. at 892 n.3.
475. Id. at 893.
476. Id. at 894.
477. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1518.
478. Id. at 1519. The plaintiffs were challenging one aspect of the forest plan, i.e., the decision to
recommend certain roadless areas for either timber harvesting or wilderness. Id. at 1512.
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that, to the extent the EIS and ROD have an impact on Congress' final
decision, waiting until the Department acts on a specific project would not
be an adequate remedy." 47 9
The Ninth Circuit has followed its holding in Idaho Conservation
League even when plaintiffs are challenging entire plans. 8 The court
expressed its reasoning in Idaho Conservation League, where it said, "[A]
future challenge to a particular, site-specific action would lose much force
once the overall plan has been approved-especially if the challenge were
premised on the view that the overall plan grew out of erroneous
assumptions. 481 In other words, the fact that further decisions must still
be made before ground-disturbing action occurs does not minimize the
finality or potential impact of the underlying forest plan. 82 National
Wildlife Federation is readily distinguishable on its facts, as it involved a
nationwide program that was not mandated by statute. All national forests
must develop forest plans and must do so in accordance with NFMA. An
inability to challenge the plans would strip NFMA of any substantive or
procedural meaning.
3. Exhaustion
Unlike standing and ripeness, the doctrine of exhaustion does not limit
a court's jurisdiction.483 It is a judicially created doctrine that allows a
district court to exercise comity toward administrative agencies by
requiring a plaintiff to "exhaust" his administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial review.484 The comity afforded the administrative branch
from the judicial branch arises from the right of the administrative agency
to make a factual record485 and the technical expertise the agency is
presumed to have.48 8 The NFMA regulations reflect the exhaustion
479. Id. at 1519.
480. See, e.g.. Seattle Audubon Soe'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs
challenging Forest Service owl management plan); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt. 998 F.2d 705
(9th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs challenging decision not to supplement forest plan EIS); Resources Ltd.. 8
F.3d at 1398 (plaintiffs challenging forest plan).
481. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1519.
482. See also Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526. 1532 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that the
forest plan was ripe for review because "the collection of decisions that make up the forest plan Is
formally treated as a single agency action ... notwithstanding the need to develop site-specific
projects").
483. Robertson 1, 764 F. Supp. at 549 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Co.. Inc. v. CHG Int'l. Inc.
811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)).
484. Robertson 1, 764 F. Supp. at 549.
485. Sierra Club v. Robertson 784 F. Supp. 593, 598 (W.D. Ark. 1991) [hereinafter Robertson
II] ("Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust denied the agency an opportunity to make a factual record.").
486. This is often seen in the overall deference of a court toward an agency's technical expertise.
See infra notes 565-75 and accompanying text. For example, in a disagreement between an agency
expert and an expert for the plaintiff, the court will invariably defer to the agency expert. Robertson 11.
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doctrine, although it is not binding upon the courts.4
87
Until October 1992,488 the Forest Service appeals process was
completely discretionary; that is, the agency was not legally required to
provide a procedure for appealing agency actions. 489 However, the agency
has provided some sort of appeals procedure since 1907. 490 The current
procedure for appealing forest plans is described in the NFMA regula-
tions. 49' Appeals of individual timber sales are now governed by a different
section than are appeals of forest plans.492
To appeal a proposed forest plan, a plaintiff must file an appeal within
90 days of a date specified in the legal notice of the plan's approval.43 The
Forest Service provides for two "tiers" of review.494 The agency must make
a decision on an appeal of a forest plan within 160 days of the filing of the
appeal. 495 A second-level review, which may be discretionary depending on
who made the initial decision,4 98 must be made within 30 days of receipt of
the appeal record.497
A forest plan is still valid while a forest plan appeal is pending.498
784 F. Supp. at 598, 608; see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
487. 36 C.F.R. § 217.18 states, "It is the position of the Department of Agriculture that any
filing for Federal judicial review of a decision subject to review under this part is premature and
inappropriate unless the plaintiff has first sought to invoke and exhaust the procedures available under
this part .... "
488. Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform, Pub. L. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat.
1374, 1419-20 (1992) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1612).
489. Notice, Comment, and Appeal Procedures for National Forest System Projects and
Activities, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,904 (1993) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 215 and § 217); see also
Robertson, supra note 277.
490. Review and Comment and Appeal Procedures for National Forest Planning and Project
Decisions, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,369 (1993) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 215 and § 217) (proposed Apr.
14, 1993).
491. 36 C.F.R. § 217.
492. Final Rule, Fed. Reg. 58,904 (U.S. Forest Service 1993) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.
§ 215). The Forest Service amended the appeals section in response to the congressional statute passed
in 1992. Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform, Pub. L. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374,
1419-20 (1992) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1612). Section 322 requires a "notice and comment
process" for "projects and activities" that implement forest plans. Id. § 322(a). The Forest Service
proposed rules that would have amended 36 C.F.R. § 217, but because the agency received very few
comments on this section, and because the entire forest planning process is being revised and may result
in a new rule, the final rule applies only to site-specific activities or significant amendments or revisions
of forest plans. Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,904 (1993).
493. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(a)(3).
494. 36 C.F.R. § 217.7.
495. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(f)(2).
496. 36 C.F.R. § 217.7.
497. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(f)(3).
498. Implementation of the plan takes place seven days after the publication of legal notice. 36
C.F.R. § 217.10(a). "Requests to stay the approval of land and resource management plans... shall
not be granted." 36 C.F.R. § 217.10(b). Appellants can request stays of projects, such as timber sales.
Id.
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Some plaintiffs go to court while their appeals are pending simply because
the agency has not taken any action on the appeal and the plaintiffs are
frustrated. 499 Others bypass administrative proceedings completely, which
will inevitably lead to dismissal of their claims.500 In the former situation,
the court may be sympathetic toward the plaintiff.501 In the latter, the court
will have little or no sympathy.0 2 The court may strike a balance between
the two by finding that the agency's projected time for completing the
appeal is reasonable, even though plaintiffs claim that irreparable harm
may result in the interim. 503 The court may simply chide the agency for its
prolonged review process.504 Occasionally, the court will waive the require-
ment, but only when the agency conduct is found to be particularly
egregious.505
Not only must plaintiffs appeal to the administrative agency before
going to court, they may only raise issues for judicial review that they
499. See, e.g., Robertson 1, 764 F. Supp. at 548-49. There, the court stayed proceedings bricfly
to allow the agency to conclude its review, but noted that the plaintiffs had been "involved in protracted
and complex administrative proceedings that seem to be unending." Id. at 549.
'500. See, e.g., Sharps v. U.S. Forest Service, 823 F. Supp. 668 (D.S.D. 1993) (holding that
plaintiff's failure to administratively appeal the initial decision memo led to dismissal of all claims
arising from that decision, including all "derivative" claims arising out of a later implementation
decision); Robertson 1, 764 F. Supp. at 549 (stating that Eighth Circuit requires dismissal of claims
where plaintiff bypasses the administrative process).
501. See Robertson 1, 764 F. Supp. at 549.
502. SeeSharps, 823 F. Supp. at 679 (stating that plaintiff's failure to exhaust was -particularly
inexcusable" because he was actively involved in public review of the decision); Robertson 11, 784 F.
Supp. at 599 ("Plaintiffs should not be permitted to go over the Forest Service's head and avoid making
their case to the agency first; because of the technical nature of the subject matter, these matters are
best left to the initial consideration of the Forest Service.").
503. Sierra Clubv. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256,1258 (E.D.Tex. 1988) (finding that eight to fifteen
more months for an administrative decision was "not excessive"; staying plaintiff's claim pending
administrative resolution).
504. Robertson , 764 F. Supp. at 550 ("[T]he Forest Service has developed a practice of
making, withdrawing, and reinstating timber sales and forest policy decisions in a way that might
forestall judicial review indefinitely if left unchecked. Such a result cannot be encouraged.").
505. Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ("The Court must waive
the administrative exhaustion requirement in this case because of the excessive 'delay' in (or, rather,
the absolute shut-down of) Defendants' administrative appeal apparatus."). This case involved the
same plaintiffs as Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Tex. 1988), where the court refused to
waive the exhaustion doctrine because the agency assured the court the appeals would be resolved in
eight to fifteen months. Id. at 1258. In 1989, the chief of the Forest Service announced that no decision
would be made on plaintiffs' appeal because a new forest plan and EIS were being developed in response
to a related lawsuit. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 359 n.5. Upon referral of the case to a magistrate, the
magistrate found that plaintiffs were unable to exhaust their administrative remedies through no fault
of their own. Id. at 360. The court had no difficulty in deciding to waive the exhaustion requirement at
this point. Id. at 360-61.
In Lyng, the court stated that the Fifth Circuit requires a finding of irreparable injury to waive
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 694 F. Supp. at 1259. In making its decision to waive exhaustion
five years later, though, the court made no mention of irreparable injury; it instead focused solely upon
the agency's refusal to issue an administrative decision. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 360-61.
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raised at the administrative appeal level.508 This exhaustion requirement
mirrors the requirement that a party may not raise an issue before an
appellate court that it raised in district court. Issues exhaustion is based on
the recognition that the agency's role is to find facts, while the courts' role is
limited to reviewing issues of law. Unlike most litigants, however, many
citizens who administratively appeal Forest Service actions do so without
legal assistance. The requirement that all issues be clearly raised during
the administrative appeals process can therefore place a heavy burden on
citizen appellants, prohibiting them from obtaining judicial review of
legitimate legal issues.5"' The court may exercise its equitable discretion
and read the record below liberally to find that an issue was raised, even if
not explicitly.50 8
Exhaustion is a fact-specific doctrine. It does not preclude judicial
review, but forces plaintiffs to use the Forest Service administrative appeal
process prior to seeking judicial review. The potential consequences of this
are that the Forest Service may implement a plan while a plaintiff's appeal
is pending, thereby endangering wildlife habitat or species.50 9 Nonetheless,
before a court will waive this doctrine, it will have to be convinced of both a
plaintiff's good-faith efforts at obtaining an agency decision and either the
high probability of irreparable harm to the environment510 or the low
probability of an agency decision in the near future.51" '
Even if a plaintiff survives these procedural challenges, however,
obstacles remain. The plaintiff may have a chance to present his or her case
to the court, but the court's power to review the agency action may be
limited by precedent, statute, or most importantly, by deferential review.
B. Scope of Judicial Review
Before determining how to apply the complex array of laws and
regulations governing a challenge under the NFMA and related environ-
mental laws,512 a court must first decide the scope of the evidence it will
506. See, e.g., Sharps, 823 F. Supp. at 674 n.3; Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731
F. Supp. 970, 992 (D. Colo. 1989) (refusing to rule on issue not previously brought up before agency).
507. While the plaintiffs may return to the administrative appeal level on particular issues, that
process can take years to resolve.
508. See Sharps, 823 F. Supp. at 674 n. 3 (court allowed NEPA claim even though not raised by
name at administrative level, because facts supporting it were raised several times).
509. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10.
510. See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, vacated and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
511. See, e.g.. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 360-61.
512. N FMA claims are usually interwoven with N EPA claims, whether the lawsuit challenges a
specific timber sale or the entire forest plan. See, e.g., Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service,
686 F. Supp. 256 (D. Mont. 1988) (challenge to timber sale projects on Beaverhead National Forest);
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Or. 1993).
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consider. The cornerstone for judicial review of administrative actions is
the record of the agency at the time the challenged decision was made.5 13
This is based upon the premise that consideration of evidence outside the
record undermines the administrative process and opens the door for the
court to substitute its judgement for that of the agency.
In formal legal proceedings at the administrative level, such as a
dispute under the Labor Management Relations Act, the administrative
record can be as fully developed as one in district court. Formal administra-
tive proceedings may include depositions, briefs, direct and cross examina-
tion of witnesses, and submission of exhibits.516 By contrast, the adminis-
trative record in Forest Service decisions is often developed informally by
line officers and field personnel. Critical reviews and scientific studies
challenging the agency's decision usually find their way into the record
only through the administrative appeals process, 1 7 which is very limited in
scope. A group involved in the appeals process is not required to be
represented by an attorney, and often does not seek legal representation
until litigation is contemplated. 51 '8 The appeals process is entirely "in
house," lacking formal hearings and independent review by an administra-
tive law judge. The 45-day time frame 9 allowed to file an appeal for
project-level decisions, such as timber sales, does not allow outside groups
much opportunity to develop detailed studies or analyses for inclusion into
the record. When the administrative record reaches the district court it can
be fairly limited in scope, and is heavily weighted in favor of materials
prepared by the Forest Service.820 It is not surprising that attorneys
513. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
514. Id. at 416.
515. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
516. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs ACT RuLEs AND REGULATIONS MANUAL §§ B-102.30,
B-102.39, B-102.43, B-102.45 (1992).
517. Appeals of forest plans and timber sales decided since 1991 are governed by 36 C.F.R.
§ 217 (1993).
518. This statement is based upon the personal experience of the author. Jack Tuholske, who has
reviewed dozens of administrative appeals and brought several of them to trial. All of these appeals
were prepared by citizens' groups who often did not understand concepts such as issues exhaustion and
scope ofjudicial review and therefore failed to ensure that facts supporting their position became part
of the administrative record, or even failed to raise crucial issues. This is not meant to imply that all
administrative appeals are brought by lay persons; some of the significant pieces of NFMA litigation
discussed in this article involved sophisticated legal challenges at the administrative appeal stage. See.
e.g., Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 8 F.3rd 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
519. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(a)(2).
520. For timber sale litigation, the record typically consists of the Environmental Assessment.
the forest plan, reports from the interdisciplinary team's various specialists, background information
about the project's impacts, and the comments and appeals filed by those opposing the sale. The record
compiled by the Forest Service contains all of the information used by their specialists in assessing and
approving the project. The administrative record will contain information from those opposing the
project only if they have had the foresight to include such material in written comments or in their
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representing groups challenging a Forest Service decision often seek to
expand the administrative record through expert testimony, or seek
discovery to explain the basis for the agency's conclusions.
Courts have created exceptions to the general rule confining judicial
review to the administrative record. Under NFMA, courts have allowed
additional evidence in order to assist the court in understanding complex
issues, while under NEPA, courts have allowed additional evidence to
prove that the agency has not taken a "hard look" at the possible
environmental consequences of its proposed action.
The leading case on extra-record evidence in NFMA cases is Citizens
for Environmental Quality v. United States.521 At issue were affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs' experts that explained the inadequacies of the
FORPLAN computer model used by the Forest Service in the forest
planning process. The court rejected the agency's request to strike the
affidavits of plaintiffs' experts as beyond the administrative record, stating:
The affidavits are helpful to our understanding of the complex
issues presented by this case and therefore necessary to effective
judicial review. The affidavits illuminate the information con-
tained in the administrative record and serve as points of
reference therein.522
The South Dakota District Court followed this rationale in allowing
affidavits from plaintiff's experts on computer programming and habitat
fragmentation.523 In allowing the affidavits as evidence, the court noted
that it was not using the affidavits to expand the record, but only for the
narrow purpose of explaining the record that was before the government at
the time it approved the timber sales. 524
Consideration of extra-record evidence has been more thoroughly
considered in the context of NEPA litigation. Because NEPA requires the
agency to take a hard look at all of the environmental consequences of its
action,
allegations that an EIS has neglected to mention a serious
appeal.
521. 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989).
522. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731. F. Supp. at 982-83.
523. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 92-5101, slip. op. at 6, 8 (D.S.D. August 27, 1993).
The court found the affidavit of Brian Brademeyer admissible under the Citizens for Envtl. Quality
rationale because it more thoroughly explained how the agency's HABCAP (wildlife habitat
capability) model worked and what its shortcomings were than did the record compiled by the Forest
Service. Id. at 6.
524. Id. at 8. See also Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
This case involved forest plan standards under NFMA and claims under the ESA. The District Court
also allowed plaintiffs to file affidavits beyond the administrative record, and then relied on those
affidavits as probative evidence to deny the government's motion for summary judgement. Id. at 939.
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environmental consequence, failed adequately to discuss some
reasonable alternative, or otherwise swept stubborn or serious
criticism.., under the rug ... raises issues sufficiently important
to permit the introduction of new evidence in the district court,
including expert testimony with respect to technical matters,
both in challenges to the sufficiency of an environmental impact
statement and in suits attacking an agency determination that no
such statement is necessary. 525
This rationale has been followed in NFMA cases that include a
NEPA claim, 52 6 and is obviously broader than the "complex issues"
rationale derived from cases based on NFMA alone. When a court allows
an affidavit to assist in explaining complex issues, the affidavit is illustrative
rather than probative evidence of a NFMA claim. The court should not use
the affidavits in evaluating the "battle of the experts." In contrast, evidence
that issues were "swept under the rug" is probative in NEPA cases, and
may be used to support plaintiffs' allegations.527
Plaintiffs challenging the Forest Service are not always successful in
expanding judicial review beyond the administrative record, however.
Substantial case law supports the premise that challenges to Forest Service
actions are no different from other administrative law cases, and excep-
tions are therefore to be made only in very rare circumstances. 8 Perhaps
the strictest interpretation of this doctrine comes from the Seventh Circuit
in Cronin v. U.S. Department of Agriculture.29 There, Judge Richard
Posner espoused the view that only in a dire emergency should a district
court ever consider evidence outside of the administrative record.5 30 The
court went to great lengths to characterize forestry as a technical field
525. CountyofSuffolkv. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384-85 (2d Cir. 1977). cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); accord Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area Coalition v. New York
City Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 740 F. Supp. 989,993 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Manatee County v. Gorsuch.
554 F. Supp. 778,782-83 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exxon, 466 F. Supp. 639,
647 (D. Neb. 1979).
526. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Service, 4 F.3d 832. 841-42 (9th Cir.
1993), where the court upheld the admission of an affidavit explaining impacts on habitat fragmenta-
tion caused by timber sales in roadless areas. The Ninth Circuit followed the County of Suffolk
rationale.
527. Id. at 841. The district court adopted portions of plaintiffs' expert affidavit in its findings of
fact and used his testimony to formulate the scope of its injunction. The Ninth Circuit upheld this use of
extra-record testimony, which went to the heart of the issues under consideration. The court in essence
did substitute its judgement for that of the agency on the matters contained in the affidavit. Had the
court declined to use the information in the affidavit, the record would have been devoid of information
about the problems caused by further fragmentation of roadless areas, thus allowing the agency to
effectively "sweep the problem under the rug." See id.
528. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Schultz, 807 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Wash. 1992);
Cronin v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 919 F. 2d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1990).
529. Cronin, 919 F.2d 439.
530. Id. at 444.
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requiring nearly absolute deference by "generalist judges." 531
Finally, plaintiffs are rarely afforded the opportunity to conduct
discovery in NFMA cases. In the only reported case on NFMA discovery,
Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. Schultz,532 plaintiffs were denied
the opportunity to depose Forest Service officials who prepared the Colville
National Forest Plan. The court noted the exceptions to the doctrine of
allowing review beyond the record, but found they did not apply.5 3  The
court did not want to hold a trial de novo, and plaintiffs' broad discovery
requests clearly headed in that direction.3 4
These cases show that the Forest Service has consistently opposed
expanding the record for judicial review. It has sought to exclude
additional expert affidavits and evidentiary materials and attempted to bar
discovery through protective orders. 53 5 Fundamental rules of administra-
tive law-confining review to the record and deferring to agency exper-
tise-remain strong. The use of extra-record evidence will continue to
surface in the context of NFMA litigation, both because of the complex
nature of the issues and because of the limited opportunities to develop a
record through the Forest Service administrative appeals process. The split
of authority means that cases will be decided on their particular facts. The
best way to avoid the issue is submit all supporting evidence during the
appeals process, but the nature of the citizens'-appeal process makes that
unlikely in many circumstances.
C. Standard of Review
The standard for judicial review of claims under NFMA is derived
from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA): the familiar "arbitrary
and capricious" standard widely applied in environmental and other
administrative law cases.538 In general, to determine whether an agency's
action is arbitrary and capricious, a court must determine if there was "a
consideration of all the relevant factors and whether or not there was a
clear error of judgment."5 7
The cornerstone of judicial review in this regard, at least on the
531. Id.
532. 807 F. Supp. 649.
533. Inland Empire Public Lands Council, 807 F. Supp. at 652.
534. Id. The court also faulted the plaintiffs for failing to physically examine the record after it
was officially compiled, which defeated their claim that it was incomplete and needed to be
supplemented through depositions.
535. See generally Id. at 649.
536. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). This provision requires a court to set aside agency action if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with the law." Id.; see also
Sierra Club v. Cargill, 11 F.3d 1545, 1548 (10th Cir. 1993).
537. Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 983 (D. Colo. 1989) (citing
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
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surface, is deference: deference to the agency's factual determinations, 3
to its methodology, and to its interpretation of regulations and statutes. 3 9
The Supreme Court has strongly cautioned the judiciary against rethink-
ing administrative decisions both on issues of fact and law.510 However,
deference to administrative actions is not reflexive; courts must "resist the
temptations to rubber stamp" agency actions. 4 1 As the Court recently
noted, "Deference does not mean acquiescence."' 2 While the deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard under NFMA and NEPA is generally
acknowledged, it is not always followed.
1. Judicial Review of the Agency's Interpretation of Statutory Law
Judicial review of administrative interpretation of statutes is con-
trolled by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council."3
When statutory language is clear on its face, the court is the "final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administra-
tive constructions which are contrary to clear Congressional intent." 4
When statutory language is broad or ambiguous, however, the court must
defer to "reasonable" agency interpretations."5
The Forest Service's efforts to convince courts to defer to its
interpretation of the substantive provisions of the NFMA have been
largely unsuccessful. This result is not surprising, given some of the
538. Cargill, 11 F.3d at 1548 (stating that deferential standard is especially important where
agency's determination is "extremely fact bound").
539. Big Hole Ranchers Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 686 F. Supp. 256.263 (D. Mont. 1988).
540. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842.43
(1984). Some scholars argue that the judicial deference endorsed by Chevron results in agency
immunity from legal challenge. The agency is correct in its facts, unassailable in its methodology, and
properly interprets the laws that govern it. Statutory interpretation becomes an aspect of policy
making. See Farina, supra note 297, at 502. Furthermore, Professor Farina argues, "the dominance of
the executive that has followed the delegation of regulatory power cannot be squared with the original
commitment to separation of powers." Id. at 523. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Factions. Self-Interest.
and the APA- Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 287-92 (1986).
At least one district court has invoked the Constitution and separation of powers in its discussion of
deferential review:
Were the Court to abdicate to the agency defendants its Constitutional responsibility to hold
them to their duty to enforce unambiguous environmental laws, the Court would effectively
"repeal" the oft-times "last chance" environmental protection validly championed into the
United States Code by the citizenry.... The Court simply will not enlist itself in such a
would-be contra-Constitutional "silent coup."
Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 370 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
541. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 983.
542. Presleyv. Etowah County Comm'n, 112S. Ct. 820,831 (1992);see also Espy, 822 F.Supp.
at 361.
543. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
544. Chevron. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
545. See id. at 842-44, 865-66.
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interpretations advanced by the agency. For example, the District Court of
Colorado held that attempts by the Big Horn National Forest to implement
a seven-year regeneration standard as part of the forest plan directly
violated the NFMA's five-year regeneration requirement.'"' The statute is
clear on its face; therefore, its plain language controls.
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Espy,54 7 the statutory provisions regard-
ing the use of clearcutting were found to be unambiguous, and the agency's
interpretation was not entitled to deferential review. In that case, another
in a long-standing battle between conservationists and the Forest Service
over clearcutting in Texas, the Forest Service promulgated a forest plan
that provided for 100 percent of the timber base to be in even-aged
management. 48 The 9 timber sales at issue were to be cut using 90 percent
even-aged management."4 9 The court found that the NFMA provision
allowing even-aged management only when consistent with the protection
of other resources "could not have been more clearly expressed." 550 The
court declined to defer to the agency's interpretation of this provision,
calling it "nothing less than a bald attempt at exorbitant agency self-
aggrandizement."""'
These cases illustrate that courts have not automatically deferred to
the Forest Service's interpretation of NFMA, at least when the statute is
clear and unambiguous. While the agency has prevailed in some cases
involving statutory interpretation,6 2 judicial review of the NFMA has
taken a track largely independent of the agency's view of the statute.
2. Judicial Review of Forest Service Regulations
The regulations developed by the Committee of Scientists in 1979
describe in considerable detail the NFMA forest planning process. 5 8
Courts have been willing to grant the agency a measure of deference when
546. See Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990).
547. 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
548. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 358. Even-aged management includes clearcutting (removing all the
trees in one harvest), seed-tree cutting (leaving a few large trees per acre to seed the cut), and
shelterwood cutting (leaving 16 percent trees per acre to assist regeneration). For the latter two
methods, the large trees are removed after regeneration has occurred, resulting in an even-agcd stand of
saplings. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 n.2 (E.D. Tex. 1985)).
549. Id. at 364.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 365.
552. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
553. Congress authorized the Committee of Scientists in 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1). Members
could not be Forest Service employees, but were appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The
Committee was charged with the duty of providing detailed guidance to the Forest Service in
implementing NFMA for the forest planning process. The Committee published the regulations in
1979.44 Fed. Reg. 53,928 (1979). The Forest Service revised the regulations in 1982.47 Fed. Reg.
7,678 (1982). Those regulations remain in effect today. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 219.
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interpreting these regulations. Such deference is mandated by the Su-
preme Court's standard that an agency's interpretation of its regulations is
to be upheld unless it is "plainly erroneous.""
A recent Tenth Circuit case illustrates judicial deference to the
agency's interpretation of the forest planning regulations. In Sierra Club v.
Cargill,55 the court upheld the agency's determination under 36 C.F.R.
section 219.10 that an amendment to the forest plan changing the
regeneration standard from seven to five years was "insignificant," and did
not require an EIS.556 The court noted that according to forest planning
regulations, the determination of the significance of a forest plan amend-
ment is largely committed to the discretion of the agency, based on
information developed by the agency. The appellate court chastised the
District Court for requiring the agency to perform an analysis and consider
information beyond that required by the regulations. 5 7
Ironically, the district court in Cargill originally enjoined timber
harvesting on most of the Big Horn National Forest for violating the five-
year regeneration standard also contained in the planning regulations.55 8
The merits of that decision were not appealed, and thus the Tenth Circuit
did not address the five-year regeneration issue.559
The distinction between regulations at issue in the two district court
decisions in Cargill illustrates when a court is more likely to defer to the
Forest Service's interpretation of its planning regulations. In the first
instance, the lower court refused to follow the Forest Service's interpreta-
tion of the five-year regeneration standard because Congress had spoken
directly on the subject in NFMA.510 The second district court decision in
Cargill involved the method by which the agency conducted its timber
suitability analysis, which is not defined by the NFMA and involves a high
level of technical expertise. The Court of Appeals held that Congress left
interpretation of this suitability regulation to the agency, and further
noted, "Applying the deferential standard is especially important where,
as here, the agency determination is extremely fact bound."5 1
The Ninth Circuit has also upheld the Forest Service's interpretation
of its duties under the forest planning regulations. In Nevada Land Action
554. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US. 332. 359 (1989) (citations
omitted).
555. 11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
556. Cargill, 11 F.3d at 1550.
557. See id. at 1548-50.
558. Sierra Clubv. Cargill, 732 F.Supp. 1095,1101-02 (D. Colo. 1989).rev'donothergrounds.
11 F.3d 1545 (10th Cir. 1993).
559. See Cargill. 11 F.3d 1545.
560. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. at 1101-02; see also Citizens for Ernvhl. Quality. 731 F. Supp. at 984
(discussing judicial review of an agency's interpretation of NFMA planning regulations).
561. Cargill, 11 F.3d at 1548.
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Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 62 the court rejected challenges to the Forest
Service's alleged violation of its public participation and record keeping
regulations."' The court held that the agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is deemed "controlling," unless plainly erroneous or the action
is inconsistent with those regulations. 51"
3. Standard of Review of Agency's Factual Determination and
Methodologies
Courts are most deferential when reviewing specific factual determi-
nations made by an administrative agency.56 5 As part of its fact-finding
process, the agency is generally accorded wide latitude in choosing the
methods by which it collects data and generates information to use in the
decision-making process. This premise has held true in judicial review of
NFMA, especially in the area of forest planning.
The dispute over FORPLAN provides an example. FORPLAN, the
linear computer model used by the Forest Service to generate information
about resource outputs (e.g., timber levels, wildlife populations, and
grazing allotments) projected in forest plans, was highly controversial
from the beginning,566 but the Forest Service continued to use it through
the first round of forest plans. Predictably, the validity of the FORPLAN
model was the subject of numerous administrative appeals 567 and two court
battles. FORPLAN was the subject of litigation initiated by both conser-
vationists 68 and pro-commodity organizations. 5 9 In both instances, the
agency's use of the FORPLAN model was upheld. These cases are
562. 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993).
563. Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 717-19.
564. Id. at 717.
565. See generally Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989). In
Marsh, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for courts to avoid accepting a plaintiff's factual
contentions over those of an administrative agency, particularly when those facts relate to complex
technical subjects. In the Court's view, the agency should always win the "battle of the experts." Id. at
376-77.
566. See generally O'Toole, supra note 71. Critics like O'Toole charge that FORPLAN was
rigged with mandatory harvest levels, used unrealistic growth predictions for timber, and used
unrealistic assumptions about timber sale economics, all of which led FORPLAN to provide unrealistic
harvest levels. See id. at 53-69.
567. For example, the issue of FORPLAN was raised in the appeal of the Bitterroot Forest Plan,
Appeal # 2215. The appellants, a coalition consisting of the National Wildlife Federation, Trout
Unlimited, the Montana Wilderness Association, and others, charged that forest planners used
improper data and placed harvest level constraints that "rigged" the FORPLAN model, leading to an
Allowable Sale Quantity that was too high. On the surface, at least, this argument has proven correct,
as the Bitterroot has never offered the 33.4 million board foot ASQ envisioned by the Forest Plan. In
1992, the Bitterroot National Forest offered 6.2 million board feet of timber for sale. (Forest Plan
appeal and timber volume statistics on file with the author).
568. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. 970.
569. Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 717.
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consistent with the notion that an administrative agency engaged in fact-
gathering should be accorded wide latitude in methodology selection, and
the use of information generated by that process.
The same result was reached in Sierra Club v. Marita.570 There, the
Nicolet National Forest Plan was challenged for failing to use methodol-
ogy based on principles of conservation biology5 71 to satisfy NFMA's
requirement that forest plans maintain biological diversity. 72 While the
court recognized the validity of the general principles of conservation
biology, 573 the court accepted the Forest Service's determination not to
apply those principles because of the lack of research showing how those
principles applied to the habitat types found on the Nicolet. 74 The district
court accepted the agency's method of analyzing forest plan impacts on
biological diversity.5 5
In sum, courts have consistently upheld the Forest Service's method-
ology used in preparing forest plans. Because modern forest management
is highly technical, those objecting to forest plans are likely to find greater
success by focusing on substantive areas of the NFMA rather than
debating methodology.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the Nation's most precious possessions is its National
Forest System lands, 187 million acres of forest and rangeland
held for and managed for the people. The lands serve the public
by providing, among other things, timber resources, scenic areas,
wildlife and fish habitats, and watershed areas .... The protection
and enhancement of the land is basic to our national survival. It is
upon the quality of our stewardship of that land that our society
will ultimately be judged.576
570. 843 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
571. Proponents of the science of conservation biology urge that impacts of human activities
must be examined on an ecosystem level, and that such factors as habitat fragmentation, biological
corridors, habitat patch size, and interconnectivity of habitat types are the keys to understanding how
to maintain biological diversity. See. e.g.. Marita, 843 F. Supp. at 1537-38; see generally LARRY D.
HARRIS, THE FRAGMENTED FOREST (1984).
572. Marita, 843 F. Supp. at 1530.
573. Id. at 1541.
574. Id. at 1541-42.
575. Id. at 1542. The Forest Service's methodology for analyzing impacts on biodiversity at the
timber sale level has also been upheld. In Sierra Club v. US. Forest Service, the district court upheld
the agency's use of the HABCAP computer model, despite plaintiffs' objection that the model did not
provide site-specific information about impacts on wildlife populations. No. 92-5101. slip op. at 26-27
(D.S.D. Oct. 28, 1993).
576. S. REP. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6662,
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The late Senator Hubert Humphrey, one of the principal architects of
the NFMA, stated that the NFMA was designed to "allow enough
flexibility so that professional foresters can do the job, rather than lawyers
and judges." 577 If that was Congress's sole intent, then the NFMA is a
failure. As this article illustrates, judges and lawyers have frequently been
involved in forest management--overturning policies, enjoining harvests,
managing wildlife habitat.
However, the NFMA was not designed only to give professional
foresters flexibility to manage the national forests. Indeed, as Dean Arnold
Bolle has noted, "Congress, in effect, said to the Forest Service: 'Give us a
different concept of good forestry, one that gives full respect to recreation,
wildlife, and watershed values.' "578 Viewed in this context, the NFMA has
been more successful. In many national forests, clearcutting is becoming a
relic of the past, forest management places greater emphasis on wildlife
and recreation, and most significantly, the annual timber harvest has
declined dramatically throughout many parts of the country. Clearly the
NFMA has played a role in these reforms, although laws such as the
Endangered Species Act as well as changing societal values have also
profoundly influenced national forest management. To the extent that the
NFMA has served as a catalyst for these changes, it has begun to fulfill its
mandate.
NFMA has received disparate treatment by the federal bench,
however. Some trends are clear. Environmental groups have standing to
seek review of agency actions under NFMA's procedural and substantive
components. 579 Courts have established that NFMA has certain substan-
tive components, which unlike NEPA, define the parameters of the
agency's authority. 580 Courts have rejected attempts by the Forest Service
to cultivate interpretations that run counter to the plain language of
NFMA,58' or dismiss the importance of the statute altogether.5 82 It is
equally well established that the Forest Service retains wide discretion in
developing methodologies for its planning efforts. Courts have validated
the agency's view that forest plans and their accompanying programmatic
Environmental Impact Statements are broad planning documents, and
that plaintiffs' quest for more specific evaluation of forest plan impacts will
577. Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Soil Conservation & Forestry of
the Senate Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1976).
578. Arnold Bolle, Foreword, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON LAND, AND
RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 4 (1987).
579. See supra notes 389-469 and accompanying text.
580. See supra Section 11(A).
581. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990).
582. See, e.g.. Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 363-64 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
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therefore have to occur when specific projects are proposed.1 3
Overall, though, it is difficult to reconcile the contradictory judicial
interpretations of NFMA. It is hard to find a "common thread" when one
compares, for example, the judicial deference given to Forest Service
timber management practices in Sierra Club v. Robertson (Robertson
II14 and Robertson IP8 5 ) and Cronin v. U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture586 with Sierra Club v. Espy,5 s7 where the court called the agency's
interpretation of NFMA "exorbitant agency self-aggrandizement." 588
Similarly, Judge Dwyer's refusal to defer to the agency on practically any
issues of fact or law in the spotted owl litigation "" differs markedly from,
for instance, the Oregon district court's complete deference on an analo-
gous issue.590 Well-settled principles of administrative law, such as
deference to the expertise of administrative agencies, cannot fully explain
or predict judicial interpretation of NFMA.
The adage that "bad facts make bad law" may well be a better
paradigm for predicting judicial interpretation of NFMA in any particular
case. The pinnacles of judicial deference, exemplified by Robertson II and
Cronin, both involved minuscule timber sales.591 The NFMA was not
created to micro-manage the national forests. In situations where courts
have invoked the substantive provisions of the NFMA, such as the spotted
owl cases and clearcutting in Texas, much larger areas of land and a
species' entire existence were at stake. 92 In those cases, courts properly
used the NFMA as a bulwark against timber primacy.
We have only briefly touched upon NFMA's procedural components
in this article, but they have had an obvious impact on Forest Service
planning. With the exception of the Pacific Northwest forests, every
national forest has a forest plan, although many are being appealed. The
public has had an opportunity to be involved in the planning process,593
583. See, e.g., Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
584. 784 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
585. 810 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
586. 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990).
587. 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
588. Espy, 822 F. Supp at 365.
589. See generally Seattle Audubon Soe'y v. Moseley. 798 F. Supp. 1494 (W.D. Wash. 1992);
Seattle Audubon Soe'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v.
Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081
(W.D. Wash. 1991).
590. Oregon Natural Resources v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Or. 1993).
591. Robertson H involved a 40-acre timber sale, a 61-acre timber sale, and 87 acres of
prescribed burning. 784 F. Supp. at 597. Cronin involved several .25- to 2-acre sale parcels, which
together totalled 26 acres. 919 F.2d at 442.
592. See generally Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 798 F. Supp. 1484; Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484;
Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356.
593. "[W]e have come to appreciate the essential wisdom of the NFMA planning process. It
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although citizens are not always happy with the final product. Nonetheless,
in this sense too, the NFMA has been a success.
Courts will continue to refine and enhance NFMA's substantive
meaning through future decisions. Nonetheless, a new political era may
have begun which will have a profound effect on Forest Service timber
practices, and consequently on NFMA litigation. The vision and will of
those in power may well have changed the implementation of NFMA in
substantial ways.191 The Clinton Administration came into office in
January 1993; during the ensuing year, Forest Service personnel and
policies began to change dramatically. Some of these changes began
during the Bush administration, presumably in response to growing public
concern about the environment. The most important of these was the
announcement by then-Chief of the Forest Service F. Dale Robertson in
June 1992 that the Forest Service would adopt "ecosystem management"
in the national forests, and would reduce the use of clearcutting by 70
percent.595 Although both the timber industry and environmental groups
greeted the announcement with skepticism, 59 6 it signalled a political
change with the potential for eventually affecting on-the-ground manage-
ment practices.59
An even greater change occurred with the election of President
Clinton, the removal of the Forest Service chief and associate chief from
creates valuable inventories, offers the potential of engaging the public and diverse disciplines, and
holds out the promise of creating ordered and principled decision-making." Wilkinson & Anderson,
supra note 3, at 14. "Not only has the agency increased its knowledge, but so have the citizens' groups
involved.... We all now have a far better and broader understanding of national forest issues." Bolle,
supra note 578, at 4-5.
594. For example, Dean Bolle has observed:
Forest planning was conceived as a bottom-up process in which the conditions, hazards and
limitations would be clearly identified. Forest uses, including timber harvesting, were to be
based on the capabilities of the land. The process became top-down in the 1980s, partly
because of the budget emphasis in the Reagan administration. The interests favoring timber
maximization prevailed and increased the timber harvest on forest plans in progress. The
higher goals imposed from the RPA budgets were unrealistic and out of step with the goals
of the NFMA.
Bolle, supra note 578, at 4.
595. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, U.S. Forest Service Increases Protection of Timber, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 1992, at B 10; George Graham, Change in U.S. Forests May Curb Logging, FINANCIAL
TIMEs, June 5, 1992, at 6. It is important to note that one month before this announcement, the Bush
Administration voted to exempt itself from the Endangered Species Act in order to allow logging on
1,700 acres of spotted-owl territory. Schneider, supra, at BIO.
596. Both Sides Deride New Curb on Timber Clear-cutting, REUTERS, June 7, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File; Robert L. Koenig, Hew and Cry: Clear-Cutting of Forests
Hotly Debated in House, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 17, 1992, at IB; Jon R. Luoma, New
Government Plan for National Forests Generates a Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at C4.
597. In discussing the Forest Service's new ecosystem plan, Chief Robertson said the new policy
would allow clear-cutting only "where it is the optimum method of timber harvest." Koenig, supra note
596, at lB. This, of course, is the specific language of 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
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their jobs,598 and perhaps most importantly, the appointment of wildlife
biologist Jack Ward Thomas as the new Chief of the Forest Service. 9
During his second week on the job, Thomas issued a memo to all senior
officials in the Forest Service stating six "messages" he wanted them to use
in communicating with employees and the public: "We will: Obey the law.
Tell the truth. Implement ecosystem management. Develop new knowl-
edge, synthesize research, and apply it to management of natural re-
sources. Build a Forest Service organization for the 21st Century. Trust
and make use of our hard-working, expert work force." 600 Apart from what
this memo implies the Forest Service has not been doing, it clearly suggests
a new direction for the agency that could lead to fewer conflicts with
environmental groups, which would in turn mean fewer appeals and fewer
lawsuits. On the other hand, pressures on the Forest Service come from all
sides of the "multiple-use" debate; as the nation's resource base dwindles,
conflicts will inevitably escalate.
In fact, the Forest Service has experienced as much or more
controversy over its management of national forests in the past few years as
it did in the early 1970s.101 Protection of roadless areas in national forests
has become a nationwide concern, while at the same time local communi-
ties in the West whose economies depend on timber production have
become more vocal in their calls to maintain current timber harvesting
levels.60 2 There has been considerable grassroots support for a congres-
sional bill that would impose even stricter regulations on forest manage-
ment, the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act,603 and President
Clinton convened the famous "timber summit" to forge a compromise over
598. Tom Kenworthy, Top 2 Forest Service Officials Shifted Amid Criticism of Agency's
Direction, WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1993, at A13.
599. Spotted Owl Defender Is Chosen to Be Chief of the Forest Service, N.Y. Tt.IEs, Nov. 18.
1993, at B19; Key Player in Northwest Forest Summit Named by USDA to be ChiefofForestService
BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 18, 1993. at A221.
600. Al Kamen, Code of the Forest (Service), WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1993, at AIg.
601. The total number of pending Forest Service appeals increased from 1,163 at the beginning
of fiscal year 1986 to 1,453 at the beginning of fiscal year 1992. Robertson, supra note 277. On more
than 25 national forests, almost every timber sale is being appealed. Id. Controversy has even revisited
the famous Monongahela Forest, where college students sought and received an administrative stay of
a timber contract allowing clearcutting of 1,000 acres in the Monongahela. Swarthmore. No Trees
Fall in Forest. and 3 Hear Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at 39.
In addition, there is growing scientific concern about Forest Service management practices. See.
e.g., Catherine Dold, Study Casts Doubt on Belief in Self-Revival of Cleared Forests. N.Y. Ti.Es,
Sept. 1, 1992, at C4; John Hendren, House Report Says Cut Forests Not Being Fully Replaced.
STATES NEWS SERVICE, June 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Ncxis Library. CURNWS file.
602. For example, timber industry executives, coal miners, farmers, and big landowners have
formed a coalition called the "Wise Use" movement. See, e.g.. Keith Schneider, Environmental Policy:
It's A Jungle Out There, N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1992, at Sec. 4, p. 1; see generally NORTHERN LIGHTS
MAGAZINE, Winter 1994 (featuring several essays on the Wise Use movement).
603. H.R. 2638, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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timber harvesting in spotted-owl territory. 0 " Clearly, neither the NFMA
nor the Forest Service exist in a vacuum; political and social forces exert
tremendous influence over the agency and the public.
Regardless of whether the Forest Service voluntarily changes its
management practices, the NFMA will continue to be a vehicle for change
in national forest management. For the Forest Service, NFMA provides
much of the substantive direction the agency needs to adopt a more holistic
approach to forest management and secure not only the timber our nation
needs, but the fish, wildlife, water, recreation, and wilderness the nation
needs and wants as well. For the public, the NFMA provides an
opportunity to be involved in national forest planning and to hold the Forest
Service accountable for its decisions. NFMA gives all parties interested
and involved in forest use and management not only a process in which to
engage, but substantive rules, however ill-defined, with which to protect
and enhance the nation's forest lands. It provides the rudimentary tools
needed to achieve that elusive goal of responsible stewardship, toward
which both the public and the Forest Service consistently strive.
In order for NFMA to be an effective tool, though, courts must be
willing to interpret it as having substantive strength. They must read and
interpret the statute as a whole rather than analyze statutory sections in
isolation from each other. They must be willing from time to time to go
beyond the agency record in order to determine whether an agency finding
is arbitrary or capricious. They must be willing to enforce the underlying
policy and purpose of NFMA by imposing substantive limitations on
Forest Service management practices and balancing timber production
against other values. They must, in short, stand as independent arbiters of
the law and, from time to time, the facts. Judicial deference toward the
executive branch may be an important component of a constitutional
democracy, but as noted by Judge Parker of the Eastern District of Texas,
"Deference does not mean acquiescence." 60 Judicial acquiescence in
agency actions that fall outside the boundaries of NFMA undermines the
legislative branch and renders the judicial branch an unimportant observer
in the democratic process. Congress enacted NFMA 18 years ago to rein in
unbridled Forest Service discretion. To automatically defer to that same
discretion without critically examining the statutory and regulatory
requirements that bind the agency is to "return to the 'bad old days' ...
which were supposed to be left behind by NFMA."' 06
604. The "timber summit" was held April 2, 1993, in Portland, Oregon. See, e.g., Egan, supra
note 7, at A22, and § 1 at 6.
605. Espy, 822 F. Supp. at 366.
606. Id. at 365.
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